Argumentation (2006) 20:59 87 Ó Springer 2006
DOI 10.1007/s10503-006-9000-4
Original Paper
Argumentation: The Mixed Game
Edda Weigand
Arbeitsbereich Sprachwissenschaft
Universität Münster
Fachbereich 9, Bispinghof 2B
Münster, D-48143
Germany
E-mail: [e-mail]
ABSTRACT: The paper introduces a new model of argumentation, the Mixed Game
Model, that no longer separates rule-governed competence from actual performance
but starts from human beings and their ability of competence-in-performance. Human
beings are able to orientate themselves in ever-changing surroundings and to negotiate
diverging views in argumentative action games. Argumentation is thus described as a
mixed game played by human beings according to principles of probability. These
principles include constitutive, regulative and executive principles. Constitutive Prin-
ciples focus on the basic components of the game, that is, action, dialogue, and
coherence as the interplay of different communicative means. Regulative Principles
mediate between correlated human abilities and interests. Executive Principles guide
the sequencing of action according to cognitive strategies. The mixed game no longer
rests on pre-established harmony but describes performance as a non-equilibrial pro-
cess of negotiation that mediates between order and disorder and is based on the
integration of various parameters such as rationality, reason, persuasion and emotion.
How the model works is exemplified by an analysis of part of a debate in the
European Parliament.
KEY WORDS: argumentation, competence-in-performance, dialogue, action games,
speech act theory, rationality, reason, emotion, persuasion, rhetoric
1. THE STATE OF THE ART
In the field of argumentation research, the object-of-study  argumenta-
tion is either reduced to the lines of rationality and reason or it is
claimed to be a process of persuasion. In recent years, such a separa-
tion of rational thinking and persuasion has been unmasked as  Des-
cartes error by experimental neurological results (e.g., Damasio
2000). However, we do not even need neurology to recognize this
truth about human abilities. An unprejudiced look at human behav-
iour demonstrates that rationality and reason cannot be separated
from persuasion. Such an open look, not biased by tradition, requires
60 EDDA WEIGAND
us to say good-bye to classical models and to face the challenge of
integration in modern theorizing which is issued to science in general,
from cosmology to biology and the humanities, i.e. the challenge of
mediating between order and disorder, between general rules and
individual particularities. According to Prigogine (1997, p. 7),  science
is no longer identified with certitude and probability with ignorance...
We are observing the birth of a science that is no longer limited to
idealized and simplified situations but reflects the complexity of the
real world .
The type of rational rhetoric based on argumentative logic is essen-
tially influenced by Toulmin s book on  The uses of argument (1958)
even if Toulmin emphasises that it is not logical but practical reason
that counts in human life. In his recent book  Return to reason , he
draws our attention to the turning point of modern theorizing with the
issue of  living with uncertainty (Toulmin 2001, p. 204):  The price of
living in the world of the pragmatists and the skeptics is the need to
acknowledge that our best-founded beliefs are still uncertain. However,
his concept of  practical reason or  balance of reason does not reach
real life but is limited by the norm of  a Reasonableness that combines
intellectual force in content with a moderation of manner (p. 21f.).
Moreover, it needs to be more closely linked to verbal interaction.
The persuasive type of New Rhetoric, mainly put forth by Perelman
(e.g., 1977), brings us a bit nearer to dialogue although it is again put
in syllogistic form. The claims and their arguments are not interac-
tively combined. Even if we stress the point of persuasion and the
adherence of the audience, we are still a long way from real dialogues.
The concept of the audience s adherence remains within the scope of
the speaker who aims at adherence. Dialogue however means interac-
tion between speaker and interlocutor. Acting and reacting are the
minimal constituents of the dialogic action game. New Rhetoric there-
fore has to be freed from its monologic standpoint and be transformed
into a proper dialogic approach (cf. Weigand 1999).
In recent decades, the claim that  argument is a form of communica-
tion has been emphasised (Willard 1989, p. 12). There seem to be two
lines of approach to argumentation as dialogue, a more empirical,
conversational one, directed to performance, and a more theoretical,
rule-guided one, directed to competence. Kallmeyer s  Gespra¨ chsrheto-
rik (1996) belongs to the empirical type insofar as it takes its method-
ological basis from Conversational Analysis which requires us to start
with recording and transcribing authentic dialogues (p. 10). Kallmey-
er s  Gespra¨ chsrhetorik represents more a programme, exemplified by
a series of studies, than an elaborated theory. As a programme it
includes interesting guidelines that go beyond an exclusively formal
approach. The same is true of the  discourse analytic approach by
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 61
Jacobs and Jackson (1982) who also start from a collection  of a set of
naturally occurring arguments and proceed to constructing fruitful
hypotheses.
The theoretical type of approach, on the other hand, gives priority
to rules and structures (cf., e.g., Moeschler 1985; Plantin 1996; Cattani
2001; Stati 2002). An outstanding model in this regard is the pragma-
dialectic approach by van Eemeren and his group (e.g., van Eemeren
2001; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). Pragma-Dialectics com-
bines Aristotelian logic with categories of speech act theory.  Funda-
mental to a pragma-dialectical analysis is that it is based on a
 mariage de raison between normative insights and descriptive insights
in the argumentative use of language (van Eemeren and Grootendorst
2004, p. 110). Even in analysing everyday conversation, the focus lies
on the reconstruction of a normative level, an underlying competence
of  critical discussion . Rhetoric as strategic manoevring is included
(van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999). The technique of reconstruction
can be considered as an attempt at reconciling the level of competence
with that of performance.
Dascal and Gross (1999) make another attempt at  reconciliation
between competence and performance by combining Aristotelian rheto-
ric and Gricean pragmatics in an approach called  The marriage of
pragmatics and rhetoric . It remains an exclusively theoretical
approach that is not exemplified by naturally occurring examples.
On the other hand, successful performance is the object-of-study
within the tradition of practical philosophy. The sophists, for instance,
were aware of the fact that in performance  anything goes , that the
inferior case can be made the superior one by using the right means
and strategies. Rhetoric of this type is still alive and proliferates in
numerous publications dealing with popular rhetoric which provide
recipes for all contingencies beyond any ethical restriction.
This short sketch of the state of the art in argumentation theory
highlights the basic question of how to bridge the gap between compe-
tence and performance, theory and practice, rationality and persua-
sion. Competence and performance are terms in theory, and we have
to ask ourselves whether the separation they imply is useful in order to
come to grips with the issue of modern theorizing, namely  living with
uncertainty . I will address this issue from two perspectives, the
descriptive perspective of the Mixed Game Model (MGM) and the
normative perspective of Pragma-Dialectics (PD).
2. THE DESCRIPTIVE VERSUS THE NORMATIVE VIEW
Living with uncertainty does not mean that we are the victims of the
complex. On the contrary we are able to orientate ourselves in
62 EDDA WEIGAND
ever-changing surroundings. We use rules as far as they go, and we
orientate ourselves by means of principles of probability when rules
come to an end. There is no simple as such nor complex as such. The
central reference point are human beings and their abilities. It is our
competence-in-performance that enables us to master the complex. In
this respect I would like to recall what Martinet (1975, p. 10) told us
about the relationship between object and methodology, namely  not
to sacrifice the object s integrity to methodological exigencies . If the
object of the theory is human competence-in-performance, the meth-
odology has to guarantee its integrity, i.e. not to separate what is inte-
grated by human nature and learned or acquired capacities. A key
premise for a descriptive theory of the Mixed Game therefore is:
" MGM Describing actual behaviour must not contradict human
nature and learned or acquired capacities.
In contrast to the MGM, Pragma-Dialectics leaves competence and
performance separate at two levels and tries to  reconcile them by
 reconstruction . This key term, as I see it, has a double sense. On the
one hand, it is used for  reconstructing the implicit argumentation that
one needs to understand in order to grasp the message conveyed (van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 114f.). In this sense it aims at
understanding and implies a separation of what is explicitly said and of
what is to be inferred. What is separated here, however, is integrated
by human nature. Speaking and implying are integrated abilities used
as communicative means, verbal and cognitive ones, in the mixed
game. We simply mean more than we say. On the other hand, if it is
not  possible to reconstruct the communicative act in question as an
implicit or indirect speech act, adhering to the Communicative Princi-
ple and the rules of language use , reconstruction is meant as  a trans-
formation in the interest of reasonableness based on the  normative
background of a pragma-dialectical analysis . In this sense, reconstruc-
tion  converts what is empirically possible into what is normatively
desirable for the sake of reasonableness .
The term  reconstruction thus has a descriptive and a normative
face. It is meant as an  effort to describe argumentation as it is, but
with respect to an image of how it should be (van Eemeren et al.
1993, p. xi):
" PD Describing actual behaviour includes the reconstruction of
norms of reasonableness.
In my view, however, a theory cannot make descriptive and norma-
tive claims at the same time. It is basically this normative claim that
distinguishes PD from the MGM. Reconstruction of norms is to be
considered a technique of theory not of life. In life we know norms,
we do not have to reconstruct them. They can however not be
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 63
conceived of as an innate part of human nature. Whether we keep to
them is up to us. In contrast to the descriptive view, which is based on
human nature, the normative view claims a specific way of behaviour
as it should be, the way of what is called  critical discussion .
Even if  norms of critical discussion in PD are meant to be instru-
mental, not ethical norms, they are not only formal conventions but
rely on a specific ideological background. In this respect we also have
to tackle the issue of ethical norms. Much as I agree with claims for a
human civilized behaviour, ethical claims are beyond the reach of a
descriptive theory and can only be added as an appeal or recommen-
dation. It is true that we can assume that human beings have an
awareness of such norms  and that makes up the framework of a
normative theory  but it is equally true that their actions do not al-
ways comply with these norms  and that makes up the framework of
the mixed game. A normative theory is legitimate as such, i.e. as a the-
ory that serves as a benchmark for evaluating practice or performance.
Such a benchmark cannot be gained by empirical analyses of perfor-
mance. It has to be set up either by norms justified by some underly-
ing ideology or by collective acceptance. It is these norms we refer to,
for instance, in speech acts of reproaching such as you are always very
late. In the same way  reasonable or  civilized behaviour can be
called upon in institutional settings. A different benchmark is set up
by the criterion of  effective action in everyday life or in institutions.
Over and above norms, it is personal or institutional interests that
determine what is considered to be  effective performance .
The descriptive model does not set up norms of  good or  reasonable
behaviour. It distinguishes between different ways of behaviour, among
them what could be called civilized behaviour which can be expected and
even demanded by everyday and institutional conventions. Conventions
however are not yet norms. A descriptive model describes human action
and behaviour. Insofar as human beings consider conventions to be
norms and feel obliged to keep to them, the theory has to include this
technique of accepting norms as a technique of orientation. Here we
have arrived at the point where PD and the MGM meet: norms become
guidelines of behaviour that have to be included in the MGM by describ-
ing them, i.e. not by claiming them to be fulfilled. Techniques of orienta-
tion in general are thus to be described as principles of probability that
are based on rules, conventions, norms and individual inferences as well.
Ethics as a normative discipline is however excluded.
To sum up: It is mainly two issues that have to be focused on in
descriptive research on argumentation, the dialogic issue of a consis-
tent speech act theory of dialogue and the integrational issue of a new
way of theorizing that goes beyond separating levels and starts with
the complex of the  mixed game from the very outset.
64 EDDA WEIGAND
3. SPEECH ACTS AND DIALOGUE
Searle s philosophical speech act theory (e.g., 1979) has undergone a lot
of criticism because of its monologic basis. There have been various at-
tempts at adapting speech act theory to dialogue, for instance, by com-
plementing traditional speech act theory with techniques of
conversational analysis (e.g., van Rees 1992) or Gricean principles (e.g.,
Dascal 1994). The crucial issue however relates to the core of speech
act theory. It is not single acts of one type, the illocutionary one, that
constitute dialogue but action and reaction, two different interrelated
types of action, the initiative and the reactive one. What is needed is a
radical change in the fundamentals of traditional speech act theory.
Even in this respect PD and the MGM come very close insofar as van
Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, p. 23) were already well aware of the
necessity to take account of the dialogical nature of speech acts. They
distinguished speech acts in reaction to (e.g., challenging) versus in
anticipation of (e.g., advancing a standpoint) speech acts performed or
to be performed by the other party. In addition, the model includes
collaborative speech acts such as agreeing. Like Weigand (2003b) they
critically remark that  Searle s basic theory [...] applies only to illocu-
tionary acts, perlocutionary acts being disregarded .
According to a dialogic speech act theory every speech act is either
action or reaction (Weigand 2003b); every reaction in the middle of a
sequence can secondarily be initiative. It is this basic Dialogical Princi-
ple proper, the interdependence between action and reaction, which
constitutes dialogue. We need not know the position in the sequence
in order to know that an utterance such as You are right. can only be
used as reaction. And we know even more: it is a reaction to a preced-
ing representative speech act.  Initiative and  reactive therefore are
functional qualities: an action makes a claim, the reaction fulfils this
very claim, either in a positive or negative sense or in postponing the
decision. A representative speech act makes a claim to truth, e.g.,
Communication is always dialogic., which is fulfilled by a positive or
negative reactive speech act of acceptance: You are right. or No, I
don t agree. The claim itself  in our example the claim that communi-
cation is dialogic  is the same for action and reaction and thus con-
stitutes their mutual interdependence:
Dialogic Principle proper
action "! reaction
making a claim fulfilling this very claim
FIGURE 1.
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 65
It is not only a few adjacency pairs  such as question and answer
or greetings  that keep to this principle as assumed in Conversational
Analysis (e.g., Sacks et al. 1978) or by Searle (1992). The Dialogic
Principle proper is a functional principle that affects every speech act.
Action and reaction define each other by rational correspondence. It is
the functional structure of the initiative act that predicts what reactive
speech act is expected. Jacobs and Jackson s  theoretical integration of
the adjacency-pair relationship with the underlying rational organiza-
tion of speech acts seems to come close to what is grasped by the
Dialogic Principle proper (Jacobs and Jackson 1982, p. 223). Actually,
however, a combination of traditional speech act theory and conversa-
tional analysis is meant. The combination operates by means of the
channelizing effect of felicity conditions on the formal sequential orga-
nization in pre-, post- or embedded sequences. This way of dealing
with dialogic speech act sequences does not bear upon the crucial fact
that  being initiative and  being reactive are not only formal sequen-
tial features but basically functional features that have to be justified
by different types of action.
All speech act types can be derived from the Dialogic Principle
proper, first by differentiating the claim, and second by introducing
propositional criteria. I have dealt with this issue of a dialogic speech
act taxonomy in detail in my book  Sprache als Dialog (2003b) and
can be very brief here. According to the premises of an open theory,
the arrow in Figure (1) between action and reaction can no longer be
read as indicating a convention or rule but has to be conceived of as
expectation based on probability. Interesting remarks in this connec-
tion have already been made by van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(1984, p. 74) who modified the term  convention in the sense of
 expectation .
By differentiating the general pragmatic claim to a claim to truth
and a claim to volition, which correspond to the basic mental states of
belief and desire, four fundamental dialogic action games can be
derived:
claim to truth REPRESENTATIVE "! ACCEPTANCE
claim to volitionpractical action DIRECTIVE "! CONSENT
claim to volitionknowledge EXPLORATIVE "! RESPONSE
claim to volitionmade and fulfilled DECLARATIVE "! (CONFIRMATION)
FIGURE 2.
These four basic dialogic action games can be further differentiated
into various sub-types. I will only refer to a few distinctions which are
66 EDDA WEIGAND
specifically relevant for argumentation, i.e. the representative distinction
between an assertion and a statement and a directive distinction which
seems relevant for persuasion. Representatives are defined by the
speaker s claim to truth, not by absolute truth. Various representative
sub-types can be derived by differentiating the claim to truth. The
truth can be obvious, self-evident. In this case it is expressed by a
statement. On the other hand the truth can be hidden and has to be
justified by reasoning. In this case it is expressed by assertions.
Within directive speech acts sub-types are derived by differentiating
the claim to volition, among them the sub-type of an ORDER which is
constituted by a criterion of sanction. There is the opinion, e.g. by
Piattelli Palmarini (1995), that orders are beyond the reach of persua-
sion. This is right to a certain extent insofar as orders do not need per-
suasion, they work on the basis of sanctions. In performance however
even orders are often seemingly mitigated by persuasion. In this way, a
theory of argumentation needs a consistent speech act theoretical basis.
4. TYPES OF ARGUMENTATION
Now let us focus on the basic structure of an action game of argumen-
tation and start with the fundamental notions of  argument and  argu-
mentation . In my view, an argument is not simply a reason but a
justification for an action. A reason might be a causal reason. A causal
reason however is different from a justification. For instance, we might
say: The tree has to be cut down because it has grown too high. The
height of the tree is causally dependent on the feature of growing. The
action of cutting down however depends on other  reasons : the tree, if
it is high, disturbs the view, becomes a danger in a storm, etc. What
counts as justification is dependent on the speaker, on their purposes
and individual evaluation, and is expressed by a claim to truth in a
representative speech act. Representative speech acts aim at a speech
act of acceptance. We can thus define an argument as a representative
speech act which is carried out to justify another action. An argument
therefore is always sequence-dependent.
action
Ä™!
justified by an ARGUMENT
REPRESENTATIVE "! ACCEPTANCE
making a claim to truth
FIGURE 3.
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 67
The next fundamental issue to be clarified refers to the question of
the superordinate action that is supported or justified by an argument.
This brings in the issue of argumentation. In principle every action, be
it practical, verbal or mental, can be justified by arguments. With re-
spect to verbal interaction it is not only theses, representative speech
acts, but also other types of speech acts, e.g. directives, which are sup-
ported by arguments:
(1) The tree is too high. It disturbs.
(2) The tree has to be cut down. It disturbs.
(3) This medicine is the best. It kills bacteria 100%.
(4) This medicine is good for you. It kills bacteria 100%.
(5) Drink it (even if it is bitter). It makes you strong.
One might reflect upon what precisely is justified in directive
argumentation. In my view, it is not the claim to volition itself, rather
preconditions underlying the claim. It is mainly arguments of practica-
bility, usefulness and motivation which are used to reject a directive
claim. Preconditions are again representative speech acts, in this case
at a subordinate level. We thus achieve the following schema of two
types of argumentation:
ARGUMENTATION
REPRESENTATIVE/claim to truth DIRECTIVE/claim to volition
Ä™!ARGUMENTS preconditionsrepresentative  practicable
 worthwhile
 desired
Ä™!ARGUMENTS
FIGURE 4.
It is not only representatives and directives but in principle every type of
speech act that can be justified by arguments. Exploratives are defined
by a claim to volition which refers to knowledge (see Figure 2). As is the
case with directives, it is not just the claim to knowledge but precondi-
tions which the argument refers to, in the case of an explorative speech
act, e.g., its legitimacy as can be seen by the following example:
ð6Þ A Where were you yesterday? I phoned you but no one answered.
B Why should I tell you?
A I am your brother and have some right to know where you go.
The utterance I phoned you but no one answered indicates the causal
reason for the explorative act but does not count as argument.
68 EDDA WEIGAND
However, the alleged right of the brother is put forward as argument
to justify the legitimacy of the explorative act. Even declaratives can
be justified by arguments as we know from verdicts which become jus-
tified by the court s evaluation of the sequence of events.
Up to now we dealt with argumentation in the monologic sense of
backing claims to truth and volition or its preconditions by arguments.
Argumentative sequences of this type however are not yet communica-
tively autonomous, not yet genuinely dialogic. Let us see what can
happen with them in dialogue. Having backed one s claim or its pre-
conditions by arguments one might immediately be successful and
receive a positive reply:
representative "! +acceptance
Ä™!arguments You are right.
directive "! +consent
Ä™!arguments O.k., I ll do it.
explorative "! +answer
Ä™!arguments O.k., I ll tell you.
FIGURE 5.
Though we have an argumentative sequence in this case it is not yet
the genuine, full-blown dialogic action game of argumentation. For
terminological clarity I would therefore prefer to call action games
based on sequences of this type representative, directive or explorative
action games. The action game of argumentation presupposes diverging
views backed by different argumentative sequences which have to be
negotiated. To be more precise: genuine argumentation does not start
from a positive reply but from total or partial rejection of the initia-
tive claim or at least from doubts about it. In order to elaborate the
dialogic structure more precisely, let us start from authentic examples.
As an example of the representative type of argumentation we can
take the TV debate between Ruttgers and Scheer on the topic  Solar
¨
energy  vision or madness? which I analysed in detail elsewhere (Weigand
1999). The basic lines of the debate are the following: There is an initia-
tive speech act, the thesis: solar energy is madness, which is rejected by
the interlocutor. Genuine dialogic argumentation arises by introducing
an opposite claim to truth, in our case: solar energy is vision, or by call-
ing the thesis into question by expressing doubts. The dialogic process of
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 69
argumentation emerges as a process of negotiation between diverging
views on the subject matter. Rhetorical Principles or principles of effec-
tive action play a crucial role in this process of defending and attacking
the mutual positions. The end of argumentation is predestined: either
the initial diverging positions remain the same, or one interlocutor chan-
ges position and agrees with the position of their opponent, or both
interlocutors join a compromise.
REPRESENTATIVE type of ARGUMENTATION
thesis "!- acceptance, anti-thesis
Ä™!ARGUMENTS Ä™!ARGUMENTS
“!
ARGUMENTATION
“!
thesis, anti-thesis, compromise
example Solar energy is madness "! Solar energy is vision.
“!
ARGUMENTATION
“!
All types of energy have to be supported.
FIGURE 6.
Now let us consider how directive action games rely on arguments by
referring to the following authentic example:
A girl tries to persuade her mother to allow her to take part in a very attractive but
also expensive school exchange programme with America. The mother has not yet deci-
ded and is more prone to decide for a cheaper programme.
(7) Girl We have to talk about America. I thought I could save, I could earn
money by giving lessons and I would contribute the money which I
have in my account.
Mother Well, I ll think about it. Be quiet, I tend to agree.
As just mentioned, there are in principle three ways of rejecting a
claim to volition which refer to the practicability and usefulness of the
action and to the interlocutor s motivation. The problem in our case is
practicability; usefulness and motivation can be presupposed. The girl
therefore makes arguments by means of representative speech acts in
70 EDDA WEIGAND
order to demonstrate the practicability of the desired action. In this
way, argumentation in a directive action game strictly occurs once
again at a representative, in this case subordinate level. As we can see
in our authentic example, dispelling problems of practicability is the
right way to achieve consent.
DIRECTIVE type of ARGUMENTATION
DIRECTIVE "! -CONSENT
Ä™!ARGUMENTS problems of practicability
problems of usefulness
problems of motivation
Ä™!ARGUMENTS dispelling the problems of practicability
demonstrating usefulness
motivating the interlocutor
“!
ARGUMENTATIONrepresentative
“!
consent, refusal, postponing
example
"!
request for permission hesitating
Please give me permission & in doubt of practicability
Ä™!ARGUMENTS dispelling the problems of practicability
I could save
I could earn money
I could contribute &
“!
ARGUMENTATIONrepresentative
“!
consent
I tend to agree.
FIGURE 7.
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 71
Argumentation can thus be considered as a principle of structure for
the interlocutors in order to be successful in the process of negotia-
tion. Principles of structure belong to the type of Executive Principles
in terms of the MGM (see below). For the directive type there are
other well-known principles of structure beside argumentation by
which the pressure on the interlocutor can be increased. These are
mainly the principles of making offers or promises and threats:
(8.1) If you give me permission to attend a private school I promise
you...
(8.2) Give me permission and I promise you ...
(9.1) Give me permission or I will stop attending school completely.
(9.2) If you don t give me permission I will stop attending school
completely.
Whereas argumentation works at the underlying representative level of
preconditions, promises and threats directly affect the level of the direc-
tive claim by introducing a conditional level. Under the condition of con-
sent a promise will be carried out, under the condition of a refusal a
threat will be carried out. The claim thus becomes a multi-layered claim.
To sum up: The term argumentation can be used in a narrow sense
for sequences which justify a speech act by arguments in different
action games. Putting forward an argument represents a subordinate
representative speech act. In a broad sense, argumentation means the
full-blown dialogic structure of negotiation which results on the basis
of diverging views. Also dialogic argumentation is always carried out
at a representative level. Strictly speaking, argumentation is not a type
of action but a type of structure as exemplified in Figures 5 and 6. The
structure basically implies  in the sense of playing the game effectively 
that the interlocutors choose arguments that are useful either to sup-
port their own position or to weaken the position of the opponent.
Representative and directive action games are closely connected: on
the one hand, conclusions can be indirectly drawn from representative
speech acts to directive claims: All types of energy have to be sup-
ported., and on the other hand, directives are backed by representa-
tives: I could save, could earn money .... This connection of different
claims can be taken as a further feature of the  mixed game. At the
end of certainty there are no absolute beliefs but negotiation of differ-
ing individual views which emerge from the integration of reason,
emotion, evaluation, and persuasion.
5. ARGUMENTATION AND RHETORIC: THE MIXED GAME
According to Searle (1972, p. 16), there are in principle two ways of
carrying out scientific research:  Throughout the history of the study
of man there has been a fundamental opposition between those who
72 EDDA WEIGAND
believe that progress is to be made by a rigorous observation of man s
actual behavior and those who believe that such observations are
interesting only in so far as they reveal to us hidden and possibly fair-
ly mysterious underlying laws that only partially and in distorted form
reveal themselves to us in behavior.
Why in principle should there only be these two extremes in science?
Modern theorizing has demonstrated that there is an approach in the mid-
dle, an approach which addresses the complex and attempts to come to
terms with the integrated whole. There is no place for eternal rules;
instead, human beings are the central reference point. It is their abilities,
partly innate, partly culturally and socially shaped, that determine their
view of the world and their behaviour in general. Orientation in perfor-
mance is necessarily based on adaptation and negotiation and proceeds
by means of principles, not in the sense of axioms or ideal principles but
in the sense of  real principles whose validity is restricted to a certain
probability. Rules, conventions and regularities are used as far as they
go. Where regularities come to an end, other techniques such as individ-
ual inferences have to be applied. What has been strictly excluded in
classical theorizing, probability and chance, becomes a constitutive com-
ponent in modern theorizing at the level of performance.
A theory which gets involved in the adventures in the complex of
human dialogic interaction, such as the Theory of Dialogic Action
Games (e.g., Weigand 2000a, 2002), has to tackle two fundamental is-
sues: having a grasp of the whole, i.e. knowing the whole in which the
components work, and searching for a key to open it up. Knowing the
whole in human dialogic interaction means knowing the unit in which
dialogic interaction is possible, i.e. the minimal communicatively auton-
omous unit. Searching for this unit we passed from the speech act to the
sequence of action and reaction, from action and reaction to human
beings as actors and to all the parameters human beings interaction is
dependent on. We thus arrive at the cultural unit of the dialogic action
game as the minimal communicatively autonomous unit. The authentic
text is only a component in the action game. Culture in this context is
meant in a broad sense as a complex of cognitive and social variables
that influence human dialogic interaction. The action game is not a
strictly defined, rule-governed system like a chess game but an open and
variable unit of mediation between order and disorder, a constructive
and creative play that not only takes account of generalizations and reg-
ularities but also allows freedom of individual choice.
Searching for a key to open up this complex integrated network inevi-
tably leads to what can be called its destination or purpose. It is the
directedness of the components which goes beyond arbitrariness, chance
and pure chaos and gives us the key to open up the complexity of human
behaviour. This directedness is rooted in the nature of human beings
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 73
which is a double nature, determined on the one hand by the basic
instinct of self-assertion of the individual ego and on the other hand by
dialogically oriented purposes of the ego as social being. It is thus the
dialogic structure of human beings action and reaction that in the end
fashions the key to the complex unit of the action game.
For a descriptive theory of human behaviour, the basic driving force
is human nature. Assumptions about human nature can be justified by
survival needs. Describing actual behaviour does not mean relying exclu-
sively on authentic texts. Action and behaviour is more than speaking.
Nor does it mean that the point of effective behaviour is excluded. On the
contrary, trying to be effective is innate to human beings and thus be-
comes an integrated part of the theory, part of Rhetorical Principles.
Being effective in this sense however is not equivalent to acting  reason-
ably in the sense of norms nor with being an expert in the field. Experts
need special knowledge in their field and the capacity to apply it to par-
ticular circumstances and contingencies. Toulmin (2001, p. 106) refer-
ring to economics gives a very good example that can elucidate what
being an expert means. In economics it is numbers that qualify an orga-
nization as well-functioning versus malfunctioning. These numbers do
not make up a separate field besides argumentation but enter argumen-
tation in business everywhere. If we want to evaluate communicative
performance or practice in business and to give advice to organizations
in trouble, we need a benchmark that cannot be gained by analysing any
random authentic business dialogues. We would have to study the differ-
ences between dialogues in well-functioning and in malfunctioning orga-
nizations and to focus on the relation between economic numbers and
rhetoric in dialogic negotiations. In this way we can describe what com-
petitive, successful interaction means by describing dialogues in well-
functioning organizations and could derive from it guidelines and advice
for malfunctioning organizations in their attempt at improving business
performance. It is however quite another question how we evaluate this
benchmark with respect to ethical norms.
Beside the double nature of human beings as social individuals, we
have to include another basic premise for human behaviour: human abili-
ties are not only capabilities but restrictions as well. They are the filter for
everything human beings are able to perceive and think. Human beings
view of the world will always be their view of the world. Evaluation comes
in from the very beginning. Evaluation again is dependent on various
parameters such as ideology, religion, culture in general and personal
experiences. There is no simple at the beginning; the simple we might be
searching for as our starting point of analysis turns out to be complex
from the very outset: a mix of self-assertion, social orientation, personal
interests, evaluation and ideology. Meaning inevitably becomes persuasive
meaning. It is the eye of the observer which cannot be abstracted from
74 EDDA WEIGAND
and which separates human beings cognition from knowledge as such.
There are no arguments as such except in artificially constructed systems.
Persuasion in this broad sense qualifies the distinction between  convincing
and  persuading without making it superfluous. The general concept of
 meaning as persuasion applies to every speech act. There is however a differ-
ence between a speech act based on a claim to truth that aims at the perlocu-
tionary effect of convincing and a speech act based on a claim to volition that
aims at the perlocutionary effect of persuading:
meaning is persuasion
REPRESENTATIVE DIRECTIVE
"!"!
ASSERTION ACCEPTANCE REQUEST CONSENT
ill.claim to truth ill.claim to volition
perl.effect of convincing perl.effect of persuading
FIGURE 8.
The notion persuasion is often referred to in the literature but mostly
in a rather vague and approximate manner. In a broad sense, it repre-
sents a feature of meaning in general, rooted in human beings basic in-
stinct of self-assertion, which finds its dialogic expression in the attempt
 to reinforce or change beliefs, attitudes or actions of other fellow
beings (Dascal and Gross 1999, p. 112; cf. also Piattelli Palmarini 1995).
The dialogic directedness of human nature necessitates the develop-
ment of communicative means that can be used in order to come to an
understanding in dialogic interaction. Basically, it is the conditions of
human nature as well as of culture that determine how these means
will work in the  mixed game:
human nature
- integration of abilities
- self-assertion human communicative behaviour
- dialogic directedness - integration of means
(verbal, perceptual, cognitive)
culture - effective use of means
- ideology, religion, etc.
the mixed game
FIGURE 9.
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 75
As a consequence, communicative means are integrated means for
effective use in the mixed game which is not stable but an ever-chang-
ing mixed game. We not only need to abandon the myth of abstrac-
tion and separation but the myth of stability as well (Harris 1981,
1998, Toulmin 2001, p. 214).
The term  mixed game goes back to an interesting discussion at a
meeting of the  Consiglio Nazionale Forense in Rome 2002 on the
topic  Teoria e tecnica dell argomentazione giuridica (Weigand 2003a).
An Italian advocate summarized my view by commenting:  Yes, you
are right, we know, it is a mixed game. Unfortunately, science offers
only abstract, idealized models which are of little relevance for prac-
tice. It is remarkable that this criticism comes from jurists, i.e. from
professionals of law and paragraphs. We should take it seriously in
rethinking the orthodox separation of theory and practice.
Even if the action game represents a mixed game, it is not at all
without structure. Persuasion on the meaning side of language corre-
sponds to rhetoric as the art of effective language use on the side of
the communicative means:
meaning "! means
persuasion rhetoric
FIGURE 10.
Rhetoric can no longer be considered a separate area of decorative fig-
ures but is permanently integrated in the attempt at effectively playing
the game. The methodology of the Theory of Dialogic Action Games
takes account of it by specific Rhetorical Principles.
For a model of the mixed game it is not enough to represent the
meaning of a speech act with Searle s formula F(p) abstracting from
the speaker s interest behind manifest purposes (Searle 1979). Interests
can be individual, e.g.  to please or  fare una bella figura , or the
interests of institutions such as  to win or  to have power . Speech act
theory therefore has to be given a superordinate level over and above
purposes or communicative functions:
FUNCTION (PROPOSITION)
INTEREST [ DIALOGIC PURPOSE (STATE OF AFFAIRS) ]
FIGURE 11.
At a basic level we thus achieve at least four fundamental types of
meaning: interests, communicative purposes, and the propositional
functions of referring and predicating. Persuasion or the speaker s
view enters every type.
76 EDDA WEIGAND
Let me finally make a few remarks on the methods or on the com-
municative techniques human beings use in the attempt to maintain
their position in the action game. I distinguish between Constitutive
Principles, Regulative Principles and Executive Principles. Constitutive
principles  these are the Action Principle, the Dialogic Principle prop-
er and the Coherence Principle  operate at the level of speech act cat-
egories such as representatives, directives, exploratives and declaratives
and focus on basic premises of the concepts of action, dialogue and
coherence. The Action Principle is based on what makes up action,
namely the correlation between purposes and means. Practical actions
have a practical purpose that is pursued by practical means, communi-
cative actions have a communicative purpose pursued by communica-
tive means. The Dialogic Principle proper bears on the fact that every
communicative action is dialogically oriented and is not autonomous.
It is the very functional structure of the initiative act that indicates
what reactive act can be expected. The Coherence Principle is based
on the integration of different communicative means, verbal, cognitive,
and perceptual. It is human beings who therefore establish coherence
in their minds in trying to understand the interplay of different types
of communicative means (Weigand 2000b).
Regulative Principles describe how specific components of the game
regulate each other, for instance, emotion and reason, or the individ-
ual s interest in self-assertion and the interlocutor s interest in being
respected. It is precisely this principle of regulation between self-inter-
est and respect or politeness towards the other human being on which
Principles of Rhetoric are based. Both components of this Regulative
Principle, trying to defend effectively one s own interests and respect-
ing the interests of our fellow beings, are necessarily connected as a
result of the double nature of human beings:
EFFECTIVENESS "! RESPECT/POLITENESS
self-interest interest of the other
Principles of Rhetoric
FIGURE 12.
Rhetorical principles vary in multiple ways insofar as they are, on the
one hand, dependent on individuals and the particular situation, and
on the other hand, on background ideology and culture which deter-
mine the image of the human being. It is in the end the individual hu-
man being who decides what politeness means for him/her in the
particular case, either real respect or an empty conventional routine
used to strengthen the own position.
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 77
Executive Principles in general are principles that influence in one
way or another the action sequence of dialogue. They open up the
vast field of complex action games which needs to be investigated the-
oretically in a more profound way and with reference to authentic
action games. Insofar as interlocutors can use them as deliberate strat-
egies to achieve their interests and purposes, executive principles repre-
sent a sub-part of Rhetorical Principles in general. In any case, they
are principles of sequential structure, either dependent on speech act
categories such as explorative sequences of clarifying or independent
of specific speech act categories such as strategies of evading or insist-
ing (Weigand 2001). The issue of argumentation is basically an issue of
specific executive principles in negotiating diverging views, mainly of
defending and attacking mutual positions by choosing the right argu-
ments and of trying to come to an understanding.
To sum up: As a consequence of the nature of human beings, every
action game is a mixed game. The mixed game is based on integration
of various kinds, mainly the integration of human nature and culture
and the integration of different means. In order to understand what is
going on in the mixed game one needs to grasp the whole and to have
a key to open it up. What has been called truth or even absolute truth
changes to truth in the eye of the observer. Persuasion and rhetoric
thus become a constitutive part of every action game.
6. REASON AND EMOTION: A SAMPLE ANALYSIS
Let us now focus on an authentic example which highlights how regu-
lative and executive principles work. Recently, we were witnesses to a
public debate which escalated into a serious conflict because one of its
participants did not manage to use reason to control his emotions:
the debate after the statement by the then new President-in-Office of
the European Parliament Silvio Berlusconi in which he introduced the
programme of the Italian presidency to the House, on 2 July 2003 (see
appendix). I have to leave out various interesting points in this debate
and will only focus on the conflict between Berlusconi and the Ger-
man Social Democratic member Schulz who took the floor and heavily
criticised Berlusconi. In speech act theoretical terms Schulz s move
marks the starting conditions of an argumentative game:
statementBerlusconi "!  acceptanceSchulz
criticism
FIGURE 13.
78 EDDA WEIGAND
Schulz justifies his criticism by the following arguments:
 The comments made by Mr Bossi, Berlusconi s Minister for Immigra-
tion Policy, are totally incompatible with the EU s Charter of Funda-
mental Rights.
 The conflict of interest weighs heavily on Berlusconi.
 Berlusconi did not address the points of a European Public Prosecutor s
office, of a European arrest warrant and of mutual recognition of docu-
ments.
The last argument is expressed with a clearly disparaging attitude 
alluding to the fact that Berlusconi s own country would need  a little
reform in this respect  and is followed by biting irony:
ð10Þ Nevertheless, I am delighted that you are with us today and that
I can have this debate with you.
Schulz s destructive criticism reaches its peak with his next utterance:
ð11Þ We owe that not least to Mrs Nicole Fontaine, because if
she had not made such a good job of dragging out the
Berlusconi and Dell Utri immunity procedures . . . you
would no longer have the immunity that you need.
In clear words, Schulz asserts that Berlusconi was only able to become
the new President-in-Office because the immunity procedures have
been dragged out. The use of the verb to drag out can in principle not
be justified by facts. It is simply an insinuation based on Schulz s per-
sonal and deliberate evaluation. Persuasive political texts are full of
words of this type. Schulz however presents the insinuation as objec-
tive argument:
ð12Þ That is another truth that needs to be spoken here today:
In my view, this argument and especially the use of the word drag
out reveal that Schulz is acting on the basis of a clearly calculated
executive principle, the strategy of provoking and possibly even
offending. He knows Berlusconi and can expect that he will not re-
main cool. In my view, this is exactly what he intends to bring
about. He plays the game of provoking and is successful. As for
himself, he is clever enough not to go beyond certain limits. It is
above all Schulz s perfect use of rhetorical means, of biting irony,
disparaging evaluation and concealed insinuation which cause Berlus-
coni to lose composure:
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 79
ð13Þ I would of course also like to thank the other Members who have
spoken - Mr Graham Watson Mrs Monica Frassoni Mr Francis
Wurtz - for wishing me success in my work. I must however reply to
them and to all those who have given an utterly distorted view of
Italy that is far from the truth. I invite them to come and enjoy
something that the Berlusconi government has clearly not succeeded
in eliminating which is Italy s sunshine its beauty its 100000 monuments
and churches our 3500 museums our 2500 archaeological sites the
40000 historical houses in Italy which we have not managed to destroy
over the last two years. Mr Schultz I know there is a producer in
Italy who is making a film about Nazi concentration camps. I will
suggest you for the role of guard. You would be perfect!
(Laughter, protests from the left)
I shall conclude this diatribe by saying that my Social Democrat
friends and colleagues should probably expand their acquaintances
beyond the Italian Members they find here in Parliament and they
should perhaps extend their reading beyond the far left newspapers,
which have evidently shaped these convictions of theirs.
What has started as an argumentative game mainly based on reason,
now changes to a personal and emotional conflict, a quarrel, leading
to great offence. The break can be clearly marked between Berluscon-
i s use of sarcastic irony
ð14Þ . . . that the Berlusconi government has clearly not succeeded in
eliminating . . .
. . . which we have not managed to destroy . . .
and his losing control and massively offending Schulz:
ð15Þ I will suggest you for the role of guard:
Whereas sarcastic irony remains within parliamentary and argumenta-
tive rules, the reference to a guard of a concentration camp breaks
certain limits of ordinary civilized behaviour. Berlusconi even goes one
step further:
ð16Þ You would be perfect:
Whereas Berlusconi is unable to control his emotions by reason, Schulz
in his turn even proves able to deal with Berlusconi s great insult with-
out losing control:
80 EDDA WEIGAND
ð17Þ ... my respect for the victims of fascism prevents me from saying
a single word about this. However, I am quite clear in my mind that
it is very difficult to accept a situation in which a President-in-Office
of the Council, when he comes up against the slightest contradiction
during a debate, loses his composure in this way:
Even if we can never be sure about what goes on in another person s
mind, we can assume that Schulz could to a certain degree expect and
calculate Berlusconi s reaction and this enables him to take it without
comment.
This game between keeping and losing composure is a game on the
verge between reason and emotion. It can be planned by Executive
Principles. An essential question remains: how can speech acts of prov-
ocation be distinguished from speech acts of INSULT? In this respect the
utterance of the President of the European Parliament Cox is illumi-
nating:
ð18Þ Berlusconi perhaps allowed himself to go beyond the ordinary rules
of engagement:
Reason tells the interlocutors to behave within  the ordinary rules of
engagement . The individual may go beyond these ordinary rules, he
will however be called back by others who consider these rules as
norms that do not allow emotions to dominate in public speech nor to
express comments which are  out of respect for the values we all share
as Europeans as another member of the European Parliament calls it.
But where are the limits? In my view, a provocation is a calculated
attempt to challenge the opponent, an insult however tries to hurt. It
mostly happens unexpectedly, is not strategically planned, it is
induced by emotions, and hits an opponent s sore point. The differ-
ence between provocation and insult is not clearly marked because, as
we have known since Austin s times, whether an utterance actually
offends comes out as a perlocutionary effect. What we consider to be
provocation is taken as a personal insult by Berlusconi. Whereas
Berlusconi refuses to withdraw his comments, which according to him
were  said ironically , Cox, the President, closes the debate with an
expression of personal regret about the insult caused to Schulz.
A last question remains to be tackled which refers to the structure
of the whole debate and especially to the change from an argumenta-
tive debate to an argument in the sense of a quarrel. Very interest-
ingly, the English language uses the term  argument not only in the
sense of justification for an action. In specific collocations, the word is
also used for a quarrel, e.g.: Berlusconi and Schulz now have an argu-
ment, demonstrating the close connection between both. Normally, a
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 81
quarrel happens, one gets involved in it without intending to. An
argument changes to a quarrel when emotions begin to dominate and
cause the actors to leave the  ordinary rules of engagement . The quar-
rel is there when both actors have left the ordinary rules (Weigand
1988).
In our case it is Schulz who deliberately provokes. Berlusconi might
have simply rejected Schulz s remarks by keeping his emotions under
control. No quarrel would have emerged. Instead, he loses his compo-
sure and massively insults Schulz. His insult marks the potential start-
ing point of a quarrel. It does however not lead to an open quarrel
because Schulz is able to control his emotions and refrains from hit-
ting back. The sequence of actions can thus be structured according to
the following schema:
statementBerlusconi "!  acceptanceSchulz
provocation "! ironic rejectionBerlusconi
insult "! dialogue breakSchulz
FIGURE 14.
The sequence seems to consist of representative speech acts if one does
not take into account a fundamental sequencing principle: every reac-
tion which is not the final reaction can secondarily be taken as initia-
tive. The sequence thus becomes a double-layered sequence. The
reactive speech acts in the debate therefore have a primary reactive
function, e.g. non-acceptance or ironic rejection, and a secondary ini-
tiative function, the representative functions of provocation and insult.
To sum up: Dialogic interaction is guided by Principles of Probabil-
ity, among them Executive Principles and Principles of Emotion. Ber-
lusconi was unable to use reason to control his emotions and thus
disqualified himself as a politician, whereas Schulz presented himself as
someone who was very cool, able to take criticism, even the grave
insult by Berlusconi. The whole debate is an institutional debate, on
the level of the European Parliament, not between two individuals.
Schulz s provocation is to be considered as provocation by the left
party, and not his own personal provocation. He plays the game of
personal vulnerability, which is an open game, and wins because Ber-
lusconi indeed takes it personally and feels insulted. Schulz was able to
calculate this course of the dialogue with a high degree of probability
on the basis of Executive Principles which take account of the way
Berlusconi is inclined to behave.
82 EDDA WEIGAND
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE INTEGRATED WHOLE
One of the basic traditions of Western thought is the belief in cer-
tainty, in a presupposition that science is about causes not chance. In
the same spirit of certainty, modern linguistics has added arbitrary
fixed conventions and codes. In contrast to that, action theory has
introduced intention and with it the problem of how to reconcile cau-
ses and codes with the constructive and adaptive role of human
beings. Addressing the integrated whole inevitably presupposes that we
are prepared to leave classical deterministic orthodoxy behind us and
to get involved in the  mixed game. This is precisely the issue in phys-
ics and biology, too, where Prigogine (1997) speaks of the  construc-
tive role of the arrow of time and states that we have reached  the
end of certainty . It is time to accept the end of certainty and with it a
challenging turning point in the history of science not only in cosmol-
ogy but also in the humanities and social sciences. Consequently, for
argumentation theory the game has changed from a rule-governed
game like chess to an open game along the lines of our competence-
in-performance.
8. APPENDIX
Debates of the European Parliament (http://www.europarl.eu.int/
home/default_en.htm)
Sitting of Wednesday 2 July 2003
The programme of the Italian Presidency
[...]
SCHULZ (PSE).  (DE) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I would
first like to reply to Mr Poettering, who was waxing positively lyrical
about the Presidency representatives who have travelled from Italy today:
Berlusconi, Fini, Frattini, Buttiglione  I was even worried that he was
going to move on to Maldini, Del Piero, Garibaldi and Cavour! But there
is one person he forgot, and that is Mr Bossi. He is also a member of the
Italian Government, and the least utterance from this man is far worse
than anything that inspired this House to censure Austria and oppose the
Freedom Party s inclusion in the Austrian Government. We ought to talk
about him as well!
(Applause)
I realise that you are not responsible for your ministers IQs, Mr Presi-
dent-in-Office of the Council, but you are responsible for what they say.
The comments made by Mr Bossi, your Minister for Immigration Policy,
which you mentioned in your speech, are totally incompatible with
the EU s Charter of Fundamental Rights. As President-in-Office of the
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 83
Council, it falls to you to defend those values, so I call on you to defend
those values against your own minister!
I would like to pick up on a point made here by Mr Di Pietro. He said
that we should not allow conflict of interest to infect Europe. Yes, he is
quite right, and we have now found ourselves in a difficult situation for
some days in this House whenever we talk about the Italian Presidency,
because we keep being told,  now you must be careful not to criticise Ber-
lusconi because of what he is doing in Italy, because the European Parlia-
ment is not the right place for that . Why should that be? Is Italy not a
member of the European Union?
(Applause)
Of course the European Parliament is the right place, and I shall tell
you why. The members of Italy s Parliament are elected to concern them-
selves with your actions as the Prime Minister of Italy, and we are elected
to debate what you do as President of the European Council; that is our
responsibility. You talked about the area of freedom, security and justice,
and about the Tampere process. You used a single term, Europol, but
you did not use those three terms. I wanted to remind you about that and
ask if you could say a few words about those three concepts. What do
you intend to do to speed up the establishment of a European Public
Prosecutor s office?
(Applause)
What do you intend to do to speed up the introduction of the Euro-
pean arrest warrant? What are you planning to do about the mutual rec-
ognition of documents in cross-border criminal proceedings? I think you
could do with a little reform in your own country when it comes to the
authenticity of documents. If you were to implement that reform in your
own country, the European arrest warrant could then come into force
much more quickly.
Nevertheless, I am delighted that you are with us today and that I can
have this debate with you. We owe that not least to Mrs Nicole Fontaine,
because if she had not made such a good job of dragging out the Berlus-
coni and Dell Utri immunity procedures  Mr Dell Utri being your right-
hand man, who by way of exception is here today for once  if she had
not done that, you would no longer have the immunity that you need.
That is another truth that needs to be spoken here today!
(Heckling)
[...]
23 contributions by members of the parliament
BERLUSCONI, President-in-Office of the Council.  (IT)
[...]
84 EDDA WEIGAND
I would, of course, also like to thank the other Members who
have spoken  Mr Graham Watson, Mrs Monica Frassoni, Mr
Francis Wurtz  for wishing me success in my work. I must, how-
ever, reply to them and to all those who have given an utterly dis-
torted view of Italy that is far from the truth. I invite them to come
and enjoy something that the Berlusconi government has clearly not
succeeded in eliminating, which is Italy s sunshine, its beauty, its
100,000 monuments and churches, our 3,500 museums, our 2,500
archaeological sites, the 40,000 historical houses in Italy, which we
have not managed to destroy over the last two years. Mr Schultz, I
know there is a producer in Italy who is making a film about Nazi
concentration camps. I will suggest you for the role of guard. You
would be perfect!
(Laughter, protests from the left)
I shall conclude this diatribe by saying that my Social Democrat
friends and colleagues should probably expand their acquaintances
beyond the Italian Members they find here in Parliament and they
should perhaps extend their reading beyond the far left newspapers,
which have evidently shaped these convictions of theirs.
[...]
PRESIDENT. In the course of Mr Berlusconi s vigorous and colour-
ful response to the debate, a remark was made in respect of one of our
colleagues, Mr Schulz, who, under the Rules of Procedure, is entitled to
make a statement to the House if he so wishes. I would like to make that
quite clear before I invite President Prodi to speak. What I will do first,
following procedure, is hear President Prodi and then, if he wishes, I will
invite Mr Schulz to make a personal statement at the end of the debate,
as provided for under Rule 122.
(Protests)
´
BARON CRESPO (PSE).  (ES) I am speaking to ask you, as Presi-
dent, to protect the rights of the Members, in particular the honour of
Mr Schulz.
(Applause)
You have made a proposal. I would ask you, as well as giving the
floor to Mr Schulz, to call on Mr Berlusconi, the President-in-Office of
the Council, to withdraw those comments, out of respect for the
values we all share as Europeans.
(Applause)
PRESIDENT. It is perhaps better that we should deal with this mat-
ter directly. I do not want to open up a whole debate. There is consid-
erable emotion in the House regarding this. It is very clear that a
Member is entitled to make a contribution in a debate and to have it
responded to with some serenity. In this case, in the vigour and flow of
ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME 85
his response, Mr Berlusconi perhaps allowed himself to go beyond the
ordinary rules of engagement.
(Mixed reactions)
I will first hear Mr Schulz, who is entitled to speak, and then I shall
return to the President-in-Office of the Council, if he wishes to
respond. We will close the debate after hearing Mr Prodi.
SCHULZ (PSE).  (DE) Mr President, thank you for giving me the
floor. I do not need three minutes. I will be very brief. During his
statement, if the translation was correct, Mr Berlusconi said that a
director is currently shooting a film in Italy about the concentration
camps, and was inviting me to take the role of the Kapo ...
(Heckling)
... that is to say, the role of the SS henchman. I have only one thing
to say to you in response: my respect for the victims of fascism pre-
vents me from saying a single word about this. However, I am quite
clear in my mind that it is very difficult to accept a situation in which
a President-in-Office of the Council, when he comes up against the
slightest contradiction during a debate, loses his composure in this
way.
(Loud and sustained applause from the left and centre left)
(Standing ovation)
BERLUSCONI, President-in-Office of the Council.  (IT) Mr Presi-
dent, who was not in the Chamber to hear Mr Schulz s speech? That he
should insult me seriously on a personal level, gesticulating and in a tone
of voice that really is unacceptable in a Parliament like this. I said what I
said ironically. If you are all unable to understand irony, I am sorry. But
I will not withdraw what I said ironically unless Mr Schulz withdraws the
personal insults he made. I said it ironically; he did that maliciously!
(Applause from the right, uproar on the left)
PRESIDENT. Colleagues! Please, could we have some calm!
There are many colleagues who wish to make points of order and
to speak. We are running very late. I will not take those points.
I wish to say, as President of the House, that I personally regret the
tone that the latter part of this morning s debate has taken. It is
unfortunate. It is a distraction from the European business we have in
hand. It is regrettable.
I should now like to invite the President of the European Commission
to close this debate in some serenity and then to proceed to the vote.
(Sustained applause)
[...]
contribution by Romano Prodi
PRESIDENT. I know that many colleagues wish to speak, but we
have considerably run over our time.
86 EDDA WEIGAND
Before closing this debate and handing over to one of the Vice-Pres-
idents to conduct the vote, I should like to say that personally I regret
the offence caused to our respected Member and colleague, Mr Schulz.
(Loud applause)
The debate is closed.
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