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China Report
DOI: 10.1177/000944550704300301
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Sanusha Naidu
the Future Hold?
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC): What Does
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CHINA REPORT 43 : 3 (2007): 283–296
SAGE Publications Los Angeles/London/New Delhi/Singapore
DOI: 10.1177/000944550704300301
I Articles
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC): What Does the Future Hold?
Sanusha Naidu
FOCAC 2006 concluded a year that was dubbed by the Chinese leadership as China’s ‘Year of Africa’.
On the surface, the ‘Year of Africa’ demonstrated a striking success for China. However, there are
important factors that can undermine the relationship between Africa and China. The aim of
this article is to explore whether the future of FOCAC can and would strengthen relations between
Africa and China. What are the threats to FOCAC’s future? To what extent are the commitments of
FOCAC realistic? And more importantly, whose interests does FOCAC serve?
The year 2006 must be seen as a significant one in the history of China’s African
relations. It marked the 50th anniversary of the establishment of formal Sino-African
diplomatic ties, which began with Egypt in 1956. The year began with the Chinese
Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxing, visiting six African countries
1
in what has become an
annual event in Beijing’s external relations with the continent. The Foreign Minister’s
January trip coincided with the Chinese leadership releasing their first formal White
Policy Paper on China’s African Relations. This was followed by President Hu Jintao’s
April tour to three African countries.
2
In June the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, par-
ticipated in the World Economic Forum hosted in Cape Town, and went on to visit
several African states.
3
Each of these visits had one single objective, namely, to further
consolidate Beijing’s strategic partnership with Africa. With each of the visits China’s
top three executives emphasised the critical importance Africa plays in Beijing’s external
relations towards realising the mutually shared goals of South-South cooperation,
1
These were Cape Verde Island, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. It was also during the
Foreign Minister’s visit to these nations that the China released its African policy paper.
2
Nigeria, Kenya and Morocco.
3
Angola, Congo, Egypt, Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.
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China Report 43, 3 (2007): 283–296
harmony of interests, peaceful co-existence and a multilateral world order in the
twenty-first century. But it also saw China boosting its access to Africa’s extractive
industry with increased exploration rights to oil fields and stakes in offshore blocks,
as well as investing in the continent’s moribund infrastructure. By the same measure
Africa’s leaders could not dismiss that China represents a new impulse in the continent’s
developmental affairs.
The year ended on a high with the Third Ministerial Meeting and First Heads of
State Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) taking place in
Beijing from 3 to 5 November. Believed to be one of the largest gatherings to be held
on Chinese soil with forty-eight African governments and some 1,500 business persons
attending, FOCAC 2006 concluded a year that was dubbed by the Chinese leadership
as China’s ‘Year of Africa’.
On the surface, the ‘Year of Africa’ demonstrated a striking success for China. Two
way trade almost reached an impressive US$ 50 billion from US$ 40 billion in 2005,
while Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to the continent were substantially
increased as a result of the US$ 1.9 billion new investment and business deals signed
at FOCAC 2006. And this momentum is continuing into 2007. As this article is
being written, the Chinese Foreign Minister concluded a six-nation African tour
4
where commitments to debt relief, increased investments in oil resources and public
works and expansion into Africa’s non-extractive industry have topped the agenda.
In February 2007, President Hu will be visiting South Africa as part of an eight
5
nation African tour, which is his second visit to the continent in less than a year and
the third in three years.
These visits are not merely symbolic overtures on the part of China’s leadership;
they are illustrative of the premium that China places on its African engagements.
The deepening of political and economic involvement in Africa is realised through a
mix of aid, special concessions, debt relief, scholarships, peacekeeping, the provision
of educational and medical training personnel and infrastructural investment projects.
This represents a stark departure from the past under Mao Zedong, when the re-
lationship was guided by the ideological conflict of the Cold War and especially
Beijing’s attempts to dislodge Moscow’s influence in the Third World. Now economic
pragmatism and symbolic diplomacy appear to navigate Sino-African relations.
But China’s deepening engagement with Africa has also generated an alarmist
tendency in scholarship with arguments labelling the behaviour of China in Africa as
a form of new colonialism and/or neo-imperialism and as a twenty-first century
Scramble for Africa, particularly in the extractive industry and the continent’s develop-
ment future. Such arguments cannot be ignored since they point to important caveats
that can undermine the relationship between Africa and China. The aim of this art-
icle is to explore whether the future of FOCAC can and would strengthen relations
4
Botswana, Eritrea, Chad, Central African Republic, Benin, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea Bissau.
5
The countries are Liberia, Cameroon, Mozambique, Namibia, Sudan, South Africa, Seychelles and
Zambia.
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
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China Report 43, 3 (2007): 283–296
between Africa and China. What are the threats to FOCAC’s future? To what extent
are the commitments of FOCAC realistic? And more importantly, whose interests
does FOCAC serve?
The purpose of this article is not to disparage the important prospects FOCAC
will have in strengthening Sino-African ties. But neither is it the intention of this
author to become complacent about FOCAC’s role in the future of China’s African
relations. Instead, this article is designed to ask the more awkward questions about
the sustainability of FOCAC as China consolidates its place in the global system and
as Africa’s development trajectory becomes more complex. In particular, the
article attempts to explore what are the mutual benefits that can be gained from
FOCAC and the policy considerations that African leaders need to undertake to ensure
that the relationship with China is viable in the long term.
THE FORTUNES OF FOCAC
Since the inception of the Forum in 2000 and the Addis Ababa meeting in 2003,
FOCAC has acted as vehicle through which Sino-African relations have been
strengthened. Over the last six years, China has augmented its presence as an important
trade and investment partner to Africa. Following the establishment of FOCAC in
2000, bilateral trade flows between China and the African Continent have soared to
approximately US$ 40 billion in 2005, an eight-fold increase from US$ 5 billion
recorded in 1995, thereby making China Africa’s third largest trading partner after
the European Union and the United States. Within the same period Chinese imports
from Africa rose by 1380 per cent. In 2005, the top ten African countries exporting
to China were, notably, the natural resource-rich states of Angola, Sudan, Congo,
Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Chad, Egypt and Gabon (see Figure 1).
Clearly Angola has surpassed Sudan to become the continent’s primary exporter
of crude oil to China, which has no doubt been aided by Beijing’s US$ 3 billion oil-
backed credit line to Luanda in 2005. In 2006 it was reported that Angola even
supplanted Saudi Arabia as China’s leading oil supplier.
While oil dominates China’s trade relationship with Africa, Beijing has also been
keenly interested in Africa’s non-oil industries. During the same period, apart from
crude oil, other Chinese imports from Africa that were on the top ten list included
iron ore, cotton, diamonds, logs, platinum, cobalt, manganese and refined copper,
signalling that China’s interest in Africa’s extractive sector is in part aligned to the
PRC’s (People’s Republic of China) economic boom (see Figure 2).
According to a 2006 Deutsche Bank Report, ‘China will remain hungry for com-
modities over the coming 15 years’, while it forecasts that ‘China’s import demand
until 2020 is that the growth of demand will remain in lower double digits for most
commodities over the next decade’ (Trinh and Voss 2006: 1). Such projections are
fuelled by what analysts assert, are patterns linked to China’s future developmental
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Figure 1
Chinese Oil Imports from Africa Country-wise, 2004 & 2005 (Millions of US$)
Source: World Atlas Data 2005.
Figure 2
Top 10 Chinese Imports from Africa, 2005 (Millions of US$)
Source: World Atlas Data 2005.
path, and the relationship between the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per
capita and its demand per capita for certain commodities. If these predictions are
accurate and follow the linear trend of industrial development, as in the case of
South Korea’s development and its related demand for commodities, then China’s
commodity surge will, indeed, continue. At present, China’s need for such com-
modities is underpinned by the booming domestic economy and the demand this is
creating for overseas exploration.
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Evidence to this effect is already being seen in the various investment projects that
are being negotiated with African countries. At present, reports suggest that there are
between 700 and 800 Chinese companies, ranging from big corporates to small
enterprises, that have invested on the continent and whose operations cover an array
of industries. These include copper, iron ore, platinum, wood, manganese, cobalt
and other base metals, which are shaping China’s investment in countries like the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Niger, South Africa, Sudan,
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Recently, Beijing signed a US$ 3 billion iron ore
deal with Gabon, which includes the construction of a railway as well as a container
port. Some analysts see this as part of a strategy in getting access to the iron ore.
According to a recent report by The Economist, China’s economic footprint in Africa
has led to a dramatic redirection of exports for some countries. In countries like
Sudan, ‘China now takes over 70% of exports, compared with 10% or so in 1995’,
while ‘Burkina Faso sends a third of its exports, almost all of which are cotton, to
China, compared with virtually nothing in the mid-1990s’ (The Economist 2006).
It has also been estimated that by 2010 China’s trade with Africa would reach
US$ 100 billion. In 2004 China accounted for US$ 900 million of US$ 15 billion of
FDI inflows to the continent. According to the 2006 World Investment Report, FDI
inflows to Africa in 2005 reached a historic high of US$ 31 billion from US$ 17 bil-
lion in 2004, which were mainly concentrated, ‘in the mining sector, and in particular
in the oil and gas sector’. While the report goes on to highlight that this impressive
increase of FDI inflows into the continent represented a historic growth rate of
78 per cent, which ‘was primarily the consequence of a boom in the global commodity’
(The World Investment Report 2006: 41), it is clear that China’s deepening involvement
in Africa’s natural resource sector, especially its demand for raw materials, has been
the stimulus for Africa’s increased FDI inflows in 2005.
While FOCAC has strengthened China’s economic interests in Africa, it also
provided Beijing with a platform to become a serious humanitarian benefactor to
the continent. Since 2000, Beijing has waived or extended about US$ 1.3 billion
(10.9 billion yuan) in the debt of at least thirty African countries and trained more
than 10,000 African personnel in both civilian and security sectors. It has granted zero
tariff rates for 190 products exported to Beijing from sub-Saharan economies, and
engaged in peacekeeping operations in the continent by contributing several hundred
peacekeepers to operations in the DRC and Liberia. It has also supported the African
Union’s peace keeping mission in Sudan.
Under the African Humanitarian Resource Development Fund (AHRDF) estab-
lished after the first Forum in 2000, the PRC government has offered about 1,200
scholarships per year for Africans to study in China, dispatched around 16,000 doctors
to work in rural areas between 2000 and 2005 and deployed 700 teachers to work in
rural schools across the continent. More recently, through a Memorandum of
Understanding signed with the NEPAD Secretariat, the Chinese government made a
US$ 500 million donation to the Secretariat for medical purposes. Certainly these
commitments served to strengthen FOCAC 2006.
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The 2006 Beijing Summit concluded with the signing of sixteen commercial deals
covering cooperation in the natural resource sector, infrastructure, finance, technology
and communications to the value of US$ 1.9 billion. Surprisingly no agreements were
concluded in the oil and gas sectors.
The largest contract was signed with Egypt for the construction of an aluminium
smelter worth US$ 938 million to be undertaken by China’s state-owned China
International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC) conglomerate (BRIDGES:
Weekly Trade News Digest 2006). Other agreements included:
A US$ 60 million deal with Sudan towards developing its textile industry;
A US$ 300 million deal with Nigeria for the upgradation of its road infrastructure;
A US$ 200 million copper deal with Zambia;
The development of a telephone network in Ghana, and the finalisation of a
US$ 600 million deal for the construction of a 400MW dam by Sino Hydro
Corporation; and
Further agreements with Kenya and South Africa (ibid.).
In addition the multi-billion dollar development package included the following
commitments (President Hu Jintao’s 2006 FOCAC speech):
To double its 2006 aid commitments to the continent by 2009.
To provide US$ 3 billion in preferential loans and US$ 2 billion in preferential
buyer’s credits to Africa over the next three years.
To set up a China-Africa development fund that will reach US$ 5 billion that
would encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and provide support
to them.
To cancel debt arising from all the interest-free government loans that matured
at the end of 2005 owed by the heavily indebted poor countries and the least
developed countries in Africa that have diplomatic relations with China.
To further open up the Chinese market to African products by increasing from
190 to over 440 the number of export items to China receiving zero-tariff
treatment from the least developed countries in Africa that have diplomatic
relations with China.
To build a conference centre for the African Union to support African countries
in their efforts to strengthen themselves through unity and to support the pro-
cess of African integration.
Furthermore, to complement the existing commitments under the AHRDF, President
Hu Jintao promised over the next three years to:
Train 15,000 African professionals;
Send 100 senior agricultural experts to the continent;
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China Report 43, 3 (2007): 283–296
Set up ten specific agricultural technology demonstration centres in Africa;
Build thirty hospitals in Africa;
Provide a RMB 300 million grant for artemisinin and for the construction of
thirty malaria prevention and treatment centres to fight malaria in Africa;
Dispatch 300 youth volunteers to the continent;
Build 100 rural schools in the continent; and
Increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students
from the current 2000 to 4000 annually by 2009.
Moreover cooperation in the Tourism sector was strengthened with the announce-
ment by China Southern Airlines that it would be setting up a commercial flight
from Beijing to an undisclosed African destination. The Airline also confirmed that
it will start operating a flight from Beijing via Dubai to Lagos, Nigeria from December
2006. This has been seen as especially significant by indicating that it was an approved
destination status for Chinese tourists.
The Chinese leadership also demonstrated a growing awareness of the risks
associated with the negative image that its corporates are acquiring for themselves on
the continent with regard to environmental malpractices. To this end the Chinese
government committed to step up cooperation in capacity building, prevention and
control of water pollution and desertification, maintenance of bio-diversity and the
development of an environmental protection industry and demonstration projects.
It pledged to do this by agreeing to train more environmental protection administrators
and experts to be deployed in African countries. Moreover Premier Wen Jiabao assured
African entrepreneurs attending the Summit, that projects under the auspices of
Chinese firms will be conducted in an ‘open, fair, just and transparent’ manner. This
was another reference to what has been a contentious issue in China’s engagement
with Africa and demonstrated the need to assuage such concerns.
At the closing ceremony President Hu’s concluding remarks captured the spirit
and essence of the Forum, ‘Heads of States that participated in the Summit have laid
the concrete foundation for a new podium of strategic co-operation and partnership
between Africa and China’ (Shaebia 2006).
A SUCCESSFUL FUTURE FOR AFRICA?
Outwardly, FOCAC 2006 appeared as a resounding success. Politically it garnered a
broad consensus between Africa’s leaders and China’s leadership, wherein the former
probably got more than they had asked for or anticipated, while the latter was abun-
dantly generous with their pledges. The Summit ended with the adoption of the
2006 Declaration which called for a, ‘new type of strategic partnership’ between
Africa and China. According to the Declaration this ‘new strategic partnership’ would
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be based on, ‘the shared desire of independent choice of China and Africa’, which,
‘serves our common interests, and will help enhance solidarity, mutual support and
assistance and unity of the developing countries and contribute to durable peace
and harmonious development in the world’ (Beijing Declaration 2006).
The Beijing Declaration, indeed, illustrates that the twenty-first century is going
to be seen as an important period in strengthening ties between the two regions. Yet,
in spite of the new continental shift that FOCAC represents to Africa’s geo-strategic
interests in the international system, it would seem that the current nature of FOCAC
in guiding Sino-African relations exemplifies some significant issues of concern
for its future.
Certainly FOCAC is the new game in town. But the real issue is, how prepared
are African countries in dealing with FOCAC? And herein lies Africa’s dilemma in
dealing with FOCAC and hence with China generally. Options for African states
with China looming large in the production of the global economy oblige continental
leaders to develop a long-term economic strategy in dealing with China’s burgeoning
economic interests and ambitions in its various sectors. Indeed, this becomes im-
perative in the light of the fact that African states are at various stages of political and
economic development. With Africa playing host to a wide range of disparate states,
the rules of engagement between China and Africa through FOCAC are asymmetrical.
For larger economic power houses like South Africa, influencing the agenda with
China is less difficult. This is because South Africa has a more developed infrastructure,
modern economy as well as a functioning regulatory framework to monitor the be-
haviour of foreign investors. Besides, it has a strong civil society movement and its
own position in multilateral organisations and the South. In this context, Pretoria
can act as an agent of influence in generating a more favourable and balanced relation-
ship with China in forging a mutal economic partnership. For example, recently the
Chinese government offered to impose voluntary restraints on clothing and textiles
exports to the South African market. This decision was probably due to the South
African government pressing the agenda with their Chinese counterparts, following
pressure from South Africa’s largest trade union, Congress of South African Trade
Unions (COSATU), over the influx of cheap Chinese textiles and the distortions it
created in the local market as well as job losses.
Yet for pariah or weak regimes, FOCAC represents a differentiation of interests
between the state and political elites and ordinary citizens. With human security
tensions seemingly acute in such societies, the nature of the relationship between
Beijing and such regimes through FOCAC becomes increasingly intractable. This is
for obvious reasons. China has increased its leverage in Africa through the financial
support it provides to African countries. The low rates of interest of the concessional
loans, which is in most cases tied to infrastructure contracts, have made Beijing an
attractive creditor to African leaders. Beijing is seen as an alternative development
partner to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The ‘new
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China Report 43, 3 (2007): 283–296
look East’ policy provides a mechanism for weak or pariah regimes to maintain their
political and economic control, which, predictably, raises critical concerns about socio-
economic benefits accruing to the people of those countries. This becomes a double-
edged sword whereby future relations under FOCAC become nothing more than a
vehicle to institutionalise and entrench the political and economic power of state/
local elites, leading to greater human insecurity and socio-economic instability. This
is what is currently unfolding in volatile regions like the Niger Delta Region in Nigeria
where the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has warned
foreign companies against investing in the area because the central government is not
using the revenue from contracts to improve the living standards of residents in the
region. In 2006, MEND warned the Chinese authorities that their workers were at
risk of being kidnapped and held for ransom. In January 2007, five Chinese workers
were kidnapped by community-based militants in the Delta region. While the five
Chinese workers, employees of the Sichuan Telecommunications Company, were
later released, the incident reflects the risks that Chinese workers are exposed to, and
the inherent threats it poses to China’s bilateral investments.
On the other hand, the balance of power within FOCAC could further tilt in
China’s favour. With China deepening its economic involvement in Africa, it would
be matter of time before the Chinese leadership begins to pressure African governments
to guarantee the safety of their investments. FOCAC could become the vehicle through
which China could exert such force. The fact that China is perceived as offering un-
conditional free aid (the ‘One-China’ Policy not withstanding), could be turned
towards more conditioned aid and soft loans that safeguards China’s economic interests.
Certainly the changing tide in this regard will be something that needs to be looked
out for at the 2009 FOCAC Summit and subsequent meetings.
The fact that FOCAC appears to be engineered to harness relationships between
political and economic elites on both sides, can also be a disabling element for the
future of China-African cooperation. If anything, FOCAC fails to recognise the role
that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) can play in strengthening the economic
dividends between the two countries. Modifying the agenda to introduce more oppor-
tunities for the small traders will have a positive influence in enabling partnerships to
develop between SMEs from both sides. However, one of the weaknesses, of FOCAC
is that it has not provided for this category of business. Instead, through FOCAC,
China has treated all African countries as being at the same economic level. This kind
of undifferentiated approach can be damaging to both Africa and China’s prospects
of consolidating a ‘new strategic partnership’.
More importantly, it can further marginalise small and medium African entre-
preneurs from accessing the Chinese market with their goods and other perishable
products like fruits and vegetables that are important aspects of the Chinese diet and
that China needs to import. It would be more appropriate if the US$ 5 billion China-
Africa Development Fund created to facilitate Chinese businesses to invest in Africa,
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could also be expanded to support investment opportunities for African businesses,
especially of the SME category, in the Chinese market.
There is another inherent danger that exists that may undermine Africa’s position
in FOCAC. There are increasing reports of social protests rising in China as a result
of the ‘collapse of the old safety-net’ which has, ‘… guaranteed employment’ but now
has ‘…left some households vulnerable’ (Ravallion and Chenn 2005: 2). In 2005,
more than 3 million people took part in 58,000 social protests, an increase of over
15 per cent from the previous year according to official statistics. The disputes focused
mainly on wages, social welfare problems, the restructuring of state-owned enterprises
and evictions (Lim 2006). These demonstrations were aimed against the government’s
reform process and confirmed that the growing dissatisfaction amongst China’s socially
marginalised centred on the fact that the economic boom was not benefiting them.
While these social protests demonstrate that there are increasing expectations for
social justice, China’s leadership has become keenly aware of the implications this
will have if such expectations are not addressed. From this perspective it becomes
important for the current Chinese leadership to be cautious about how much de-
velopment assistance, concessional loans and grants, or for that matter, how many
doctors, teachers and other professionals, it can afford to continue giving Africa. Despite
the fact that China has become a ‘second generation donor’, the Chinese leadership
will have to consider how this may affect its political legitimacy at home.
Since not all have benefited from Deng Xiaoping’s famous call ‘to get rich’, President
Hu and future Chinese leaders can ill-afford to ignore the mounting social tensions
that could endanger the future of China’s political, economic and social establish-
ment. Justifying to its ‘electorate’ why it is supporting Africa’s development programme
while not building a viable social safety net for the poor at home, will be a hard task
for Beijing.
This was recently commented upon by the governor of the People’s Bank of China,
Mr Zhou Xiaochuan, who recognised that China has the financial resources (the
US$ 1 trillion foreign exchange reserve) to tackle the problem (McGregor 2006).
Such public acknowledgements of China’s growing social development struggles are
a clear indicator that Africa cannot rely on China being the panacea of its development
ills. A point that China itself has openly acknowledged and repeatedly recognised is
that domestic social stability is critical in developing its economy.
This situation compels African countries to find a more pragmatic way of harnessing
this ‘new strategic partnership’ that Beijing is trying to develop with the continent.
This is mainly so that the growing trade and investment by Chinese firms as well as
revenue from oil receipts are used effectively to address the internal challenges by di-
versifying their economic base and developing appropriate skills and technology.
This was aptly captured by President Thabo Mbeki’s speech to the 2006 FOCAC
Summit, ‘It is necessary that we lock in investments in addressing supply side con-
straints, diversification and beneficiation of the resources derived from African coun-
tries through encouraging joint ventures between Africa and China’ (Mbeki 2006).
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AFRICA’S COMPETITIVENESS
Africa’s competitiveness in the global economy is with Latin America and Asia. As
Sidiropoulos notes, ‘engaging more constructively with China requires African states
to determine more clearly where their individual economies fit into the global pro-
duction chain … whether their strengths are in resource beneficiation, manufacturing
or services’ (2006: 113). While African policy makers and leaders like President Mbeki
have recognised that Africa cannot perpetuate a colonial relationship with China and
that more investment in secondary and tertiary production is needed to be competitive,
it would appear that for the moment plans towards this end are far from being realised.
Understandably, economic transformation is a process that needs strategic planning
and well executed policies, like the Chinese have demonstrated. But, it nevertheless,
does seem that the moves towards this end, in the African context, are painstakingly
slow. For the moment, some African countries have the momentum in their favour,
benefiting from a commodity windfall that can be used to diversify economies towards
manufacturing and services. While China has taken the decision to work with African
governments to increase the continent’s manufacturing capabilities, conditions may
be favourable for African governments themselves to start pursuing the diversification
of their economies. If this does not happen soon, then Africa would be confronted by
two possibilities: First that, Africa runs the risk of being nothing more than a primary
exporter to China, which will put limitations on the development of the relation-
ship in the long-term. Second, if Africa procrastinates in expediting its economic
transformation, then it means losing out on strategic opportunities that may present
themselves in the Chinese market, particularly in the service industry.
CONCLUSION: BACK TO THE FUTURE OR NOT?
This article has considered the critical question of the future of FOCAC in strength-
ening Sino-African relations. The answer to this question depends on which Africa is
being considered. In reality there are mixed reactions to FOCAC. For Africa’s political
and economic elites, FOCAC is an alternative paradigm of engagement that represents
a refreshing break from the past relationship with traditional donors. The fact that
China shows African states, whether rich or poor, big or small, the same respect,
equality and maturity, makes FOCAC seem like an equal relationship. But then
again FOCAC also reinforces the old model of state patrimonialism. Like Clapham
notes, ‘one very important reason why China’s involvement in Africa has been so
widely welcomed and readily accommodated has been that it fits so neatly into the
familiar patterns of rentier statehood and politics with which African rulers have
been accustomed to maintain themselves’ (2006: 3). The fact that China’s deepening
involvement in Africa has opened up political spaces for state elites to strengthen
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their own authority, like in the case of Zimbabwe, does raise critical concerns about
the long-term sustainability of FOCAC.
If FOCAC becomes the institutional vehicle for the new ‘Look East’ policy of
Africa, then this would certainly intensify Africa’s instability and governance crisis.
In addition, it may also disadvantage China’s economic interests in the long-term.
One of the problems of engaging in client-patron relationships is that it ‘locks the
patron into support for a client ruler who may become extremely unpopular with his
own people, and whose demise then triggers a reversal in external alliances’ (Clapham
2006: 4). While these maybe intermediate problems affecting the internal sovereignty
of the state, they could have a corollary effect on China’s economic interests in such
societies. A case in point is the events unfolding in the Niger Delta or in Southern
Sudan with the emergence of the Rebel Movement in the region. Increasingly, the
mandate of FOCAC could become a platform to manage such relations, more out of
necessity ‘to protect their own political and economic investments, within the un-
certain and potentially changing environment that Africa provides’ (ibid.).
For Africa’s citizenry and non-state actors, however, FOCAC represents a much
more complex web of interests and relations. From this perspective FOCAC could
be interpreted as a mechanism of institutionalising China’s economic presence in
Africa, particularly with regard to trade and investment opportunities and the chal-
lenges this represents to their economic and social livelihood. This could perhaps, in
some circumstances, even give rise to alliances that involve non-state actors.
In the medium to longer term, China’s engagement with Africa through FOCAC
may be advanced or constrained by three scenarios that the World Economic Forum
developed in 2005. The first argues that as the US and the EU become increasingly
inward looking with regard to their economic policies as a result of protectionism
and social concerns and the failure of the Doha Development Round, China may see
increasing and strengthening regional ties with Asia as the more obvious way of keeping
its economy buoyant and fulfilling its social responsibility. Predicting that Africa
remains a primary exporter and fails to diversify its economic base, this scenario
could mean that Africa remains at the margins of China’s economic strategy. In reality
Asia has more to offer China in meeting its economic expectations, that is, geographical
proximity, a growing services industry and a skilled workforce which can help to re-
duce the production costs associated with China’s growing ageing problem. While it
is asserted that China will continue to expand its relations with Latin America and
Africa, it is not certain that Africa can play a constructive role in China’s geo-political
and economic strategy in the way that Asia, or to a lesser extent Latin America, will do.
The second scenario relates to China trying to correct the imbalances in its social
security policies. Even though China will continue to integrate globally, this scenario
asserts that with social and economic inequalities widening unevenly across regions
and classes in the country, it is very likely that China’s leadership will become reactive.
Growth will eventually slow down as exports weaken and domestic demand decrease
and structural reforms become hampered by the situation. If this transpires, then
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
295
China Report 43, 3 (2007): 283–296
Africa’s relationship with China will certainly also be at risk. Not only will China
have to reconsider how it spends its foreign reserves in soft loans and concessional
aid, but it will also require Beijing to be more prudent in its humanitarian outreach,
especially with the mounting social security crisis at home. This will undoubtedly
affect continued debt relief, the deployment of education and medical personnel and
even peacekeeping missions.
The third scenario is one which presents the best case for strengthening Africa-
China relations. Termed New Silk Road, this scenario speculates that China achieves
balanced development, ‘driven by strong and inclusive global economic growth, with
an emphasis on trade integration and cross border flows’ (WEF 2006: 3). Moreover,
the future leadership would be more receptive to democratic reform and individual
rights, structural reforms would be accelerated and the problem of inequality addressed,
while at the global level China would become increasingly active. Perhaps in the
short to medium term this scenario will provide Africa with the space to take advantage
of opportunities in the Chinese market, and FOCAC can become the vehicle through
which this is achieved.
Definitely China’s growing footprint in Africa has raised important questions about
the viability of FOCAC. Whilst the Chinese leadership would like to upgrade its
‘new strategic partnership’ with the continent, it nevertheless, underscores some prag-
matic concerns for both sides. For the Chinese leadership, it can be asked how long
Beijing can sustain the political and economic largesse towards continental leaders in
return for access to Africa’s markets and resources. Depending which of the scenarios
actually emerge, this will certainly raise awkward questions about whether African
can expect Beijing to expand on its FOCAC commitments in the future, and if it is
willing to take the risk.
On the other hand, if Africa has to ensure that there are mutual gains in this ‘new
strategic partnership’, then surely it must set the rules of engagement with China and
not vice versa. This means developing an African Consensus regarding the relationship
with China, ensuring that the rule of law and an effective monitoring and regulatory
framework is in place to oversee that investment practices are conducted appropriately
and legally, and most of all that their citizens are the main beneficiaries of this partner-
ship and not only state and economic elites. If this renewed partnership is not properly
managed, then FOCAC and Africa’s engagement with China will certainly be like
going back to the future.
REFERENCES
BRIDGES: Weekly Trade News Digest, ‘China Vows to Ramp up Aid, Investment, Trade with Africa’,
Vol. 10, No. 37, 8 November 2006.
Clapham, Christopher, ‘Fitting China in’, Brenthurst Discussion Paper 8/2006 (Johannesburg: Brenthurst
Foundation, 2006).
296
Sanusha Naidu
China Report 43, 3 (2007): 283–296
‘Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation’, November 2006,
http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t280370.htm (accessed on 16 November 2006).
Lim, Louisa, ‘China Protests on the Rise’, BBC News, 8 June 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/3786541.htm
McGregor, Richard, ‘Beijing Urged to Overhaul Welfare System’, Financial Times, 21 November 2006.
President Hu Jintao, ‘2006 Speech to the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Summit of FOCAC’,
4 November 2006, http://english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/04/content_4978.htm
President Thabo Mbeki, ‘Speech to the 2006 FOCAC Summit’, Great Hall of the People, Beijing, China,
5 November 2006, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2006/tm1105.html
Ravallion, Martin and Shaohua Chenn, ‘China’s (Uneven) Progress against Poverty’, in Shaohua Chen,
Martin Ravallion and Youjuan Wang, ‘Dia Bao: A Guaranteed Minimum Income in China’s Cities?’
World Bank Policy Research World Paper 3805 (Washington: World Bank, January 2006).
Sidiropoulos, Elizabeth, ‘Options for the Lion in the Age of the Dragon’, South African Journal of Inter-
national Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1, Summer/Autumn 2006, pp. 97–114.
Shaebia, ‘Africa-China Summit Concludes’, 5 November 2006.
The Economist, ‘Never too Late to Scramble’, 26 October 2006.
Trinh, Tamara and Silja Voss, ‘China’s Commodity Hunger: Implications for Africa and Latin America’,
Deutsche Bank Report (Germany: Deutsche Bank, 13 June 2006).
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘FDI from Developing & Transition Economies:
Implications for Development’, World Investment Report 2006 (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2006).
World Economic Forum (WEF), ‘China and the World: Scenarios to 2025’, World Economic Series
(Germany: WEF, 2006).
Author’s Address: Research Associate, Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, South
Africa. Email: snaidu@sun.ac.za
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