September 11, 1973
"We had no choice. We were heading into either a military or a Marxist dictatorship. At that moment, a military government seemed the lesser evil." National Party Senator Francisco Bulnes.
This period of suspicion and fear of Allende's left-wing government allowed for the military to take drastic actions. The army believed that there was a leftist infiltration of all of its forces and that socialist militias were secretly preparing for full-scale war which would make Chile a completely socialist state.
On August 22, 1973, the Chilean Chamber of Deputies found that the government had "engaged in unconstitutional behavior" and that the military should take action. As Sergio Arellano Iturriaga, son of an army general said, "You had to be there to understand it, the psychosis and panic of the moment. In our hearts we were all at war."
The Chilean army, an elite, but often socially outcast institution, was at first reluctant to enter into the political domain. Secretly, though, they had begun to entertain the idea of a coup d'état against Allende's government. Later, to enhance his role in the coup, Pinochet would say that he had suggested a coup to his superior, General Carlos Prats, but had been refused. This is not confirmed. What we do know is that Allende had appointed Pinochet as commander of the army with the purpose of bringing the plotting officers under control on August 23, 1973. Whether or not Pinochet was torn between loyalty to the army and loyalty to the constitution may be debated. When Pinochet saw his attempts to force the resignation of some of the coup plotters fail, he discontinued his attempts to bring them back to the side of the government. This developed into an acceptance of a coup and then an official signature pledging his support.
On the morning of September 11, 1973, Pinochet and his fellow usurpers saw their plans realized. Soldiers broke into La Moneda Palace in Santiago, Chile encountering slight resistance from Allende's remaining guards, to find the President dead of a self-inflicted gunshot wound.
Throughout the rest of the country, the army went into towns and mining districts which they had assessed to be left-wing dominated areas. In contrast to the hoardes of socialist militiamen that they had expected, they found little resistance, with many leftist leaders voluntarily turning themselves in.
Many Chileans welcomed the coup, assuming that, as it had been in the past, the military rule would be over in a few months and new elections would be held. The junta that took over asserted its commitment to individual rights and radios announced lists of government officials who should report for questioning. So trusting in their strong history of democracy, these people reported, not thinking to disobey.
The United States' role in the coup
"I don't see why we need to stand idly by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." US national security adviser, Henry Kissinger
In February of 1999, President Clinton announced the creation of the "Chile Declassification Project" and ordered the release of classified CIA documents concerning the 1973 coup d'état. The CIA was hesitant to comply, not wanting to release documents that would illustrate "a pattern of activity" that the CIA uses in other nations. Most of the documents they did release are censored, some having been blacked out almost completely. Nonetheless, this is what may be gleaned.
Despite the United States' ideological commitment to democracy, in the Cold War years it chose to compromise this value in fear of growing communism in the western hemisphere. The US had been supporting anti communist groups in Chile since the 1950's. As was mentioned, the US took a deep interest in the 1964 campaign of Eduardo Frei, making substantial financial contributions. In the election of 1970, in which Allende emerged as President, the US did not financially back any of his opponents. Instead, they sought to "denigrate" Allende and the Popular Unity (UP) coalition.
The CIA embarked on its two track strategy to discredit the leftists completely and later to prevent Allende from taking office. Track I was an attempt to influence the elections. It involved giving money to major news agencies for anti leftist propaganda. Track II was a more direct plan whose purpose was, "to seek to instigate a coup to prevent Allende from taking office."
On September 15, 1970, director of the CIA, Richard Helms, met with President Nixon and Henry Kissinger to halt Allende's appointment as President by the legislature. Helms noted that Kissinger and Nixon, "were not concerned [about the] risks involved." Under the Track II plan, the CIA provided support of various kinds to three groups of plotters, totaling about $10 million which Nixon provided without informing the departments of state and defense or the US ambassador in Chile.
Each group had determined that the kidnapping of army commander General René Schneider was the key to instigating a coup because Schneider believed that Allende should be sworn in. The CIA agreed with this plan. The CIA dropped the first group which they found to be too extreme. They gave tear gas, submachine guns and other weapons to the second group. The third group actually attempted to abduct Schneider, but their plans went awry and he was mortally wounded. This group was under the leadership of retired army officer General Roberto Viaux. In November of 1970, after Allende was sworn in by a vote of 153 to 35, a member of Viaux's group who had not been caught approached the CIA and asked for money. Although the CIA asserted that the group had acted on its own, it paid this person $35,000 to keep their role secret, stay in favor with the group and for "humanitarian reasons."
By October of 1972, the US had discovered that the Chilean army planned to stage a coup and did not need help, so they decided not to get involved in this attempt. On September 10, 1973, one day before the coup, a Chilean military official told the CIA when the coup would happen and asked for assistance. The CIA told this person that the US would not lend aid because a potential coup was seen as an "internal Chilean matter."
After Pinochet took power, a document, apparently concocted with collaboration from the CIA, detailing the reasons for the coup. This document, called "The White Book" mentioned, what the CIA believed to be a fictitious plot called "Plan Z." This plan was supposedly a leftist strategy to kill members of the army high command and had been developed months before the coup.
Pinochet in Power
After the death of Allende, the leaders of the coup: General Gustavo Leigh (Air Force), Admiral José Merino (Navy), General Caesar Mendoza (carabinero chief) and General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (Army) were sworn in. They appointed Pinochet as acting President, but agreed to a rotating presidency, which Pinochet swiftly did away with. As President, he instituted laws which cemented his position as leader.
He was soon in a position to retire or promote whoever he wished. He chose to retire 15 out of a total of 25 army generals by April of 1974. In three years, he retired almost all of the other leaders who had been instrumental in the coup. He also took General Oscar Bonilla, interior minister, and General Sergio Arellano, commander of the Santiago garrison, out of power by moving them to less influential posts and discrediting them, respectively. Pinochet would continue this series of retirements and transferals whenever he found a rival. Decree law 527 was by far the biggest step taken towards absolute military dictatorship. This law gave the army commanders "indefinite" terms in office ending only in "resignation, death, or incapacity." On December 18, 1974 Pinochet was made "supreme leader" of Chile.
A career in Pinochet's government was substantially different than a career in Allende's government. Meetings were conducted with military precision and organization. Officials had to speak formally and could not "upstage" General Pinochet.
In 1978, Pinochet forced a referendum, giving the people the power to keep him in office. Voters read a statement that said, "Faced with international aggression launched against our fatherland, I support President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile and reaffirm the legitimacy of the government..." The votes were counted (blank ballots were counted as "yes") and Pinochet remained in power.
Under Pinochet, funding for the army soared, in comparison to the Allende years when it had dwindled. Colonels made 191,000 pesos/month and captains made 146,000 pesos/month, in comparison to the average "veteran high school teacher or engineer" salary of 50,000 pesos/month. Perhaps the greatest legacy of the Pinochet regime is its outstandingly horrific violation of human rights.
Conception of the DINA
"We will fight in the shadows so that our children can live in the sunlight."
private motto of the DINA
Shortly after the coup, one of Pinochet's former students from the military academy approached him with an idea for an underground organization whose purpose would be to "purge" the country of its communist insurgents. This man was Colonel Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda who would act as head of the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA) when it was officially created on June 18, 1974.
Contreras selected several hundred men already enlisted in the armed forces and had them trained to: "spy, deceive, kidnap, interrogate, torture, and break the human spirit." The members of the DINA were promised a "carte blanche" to fulfill their duties.
The first job of the DINA was to eradicate the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario, called MIR). The MIR had survived the coup and continued to plan attacks against the military in an attempt to oust the junta. DINA agents descended on MIR safe houses in the night and took MIRistas (as they were called) away.
The victims of the DINA extended to include a lengthy list of people. After the coup the DINA hunted for people who were: leaders, collaborators or sympathizers of the UP government, trade union leaders and members, in support of agrarian reform, intellectuals, professors and university students, military personnel who opposed Pinochet's rule and family members of any of the above.
Later, in the mid 1970's to the 1980's, the DINA also captured human rights activists, religious leaders who were against the regime, armed opposition and members of opposing political parties.
The DINA continued to grow, expanding its torture centers, its chain of command and employing thousands of agents and informants. As the influence of the DINA grew, so did the influence of Contreras. As Federico Willoughby, a former Pinochet aide turned detractor, said, "Contreras operated virtually like a cogovernor; he ran an entire world that no one wanted to get involved in." The piles of information that the DINA had gathered on thousands of Chilean citizens gave Pinochet and Contreras incredible power.
Fear of the DINA became entrenched in society. Colleagues and friends no longer trusted one another because anyone could be an informant.
Abuse of Human Rights by the DINA
Human rights' abuses in Chile began shortly after Pinochet and the other military leaders of the coup took power. Between September 12th and 13th, just days after the take-over, the National Stadium in Santiago was turned into a large detention center. The Red Cross estimated that on September 22, 1973 there were about 7,000 prisoners being held there, 200 to 300 of which were not Chilean citizens. Many of the people detained complained to the Red Cross of torture and produced evidence. There were other detention/torture centers spread throughout the country.
In Chile, a few groups were organized to protect people from the wrath of the DINA. The Comité para la Paz, established in October of 1973, and the Vicaria de la Solidaridad, established in January of 1976, were two such groups created by the Catholic archbishop of Santiago with Protestant and Jewish leaders. These groups gave legal and emotional support to victims and their families. Another, more clandestine activity was to take victims and potential victims to foreign embassies where they could seek asylum. The Catholic church did not take a collective stance on Pinochet's rule. A high-ranking Catholic official, Cardinal Silva, was at first reluctant to anger the government, but became more critical as the violations increased.
Contreras saw Silva as one of his major opponents and attempted to blacken his name and his activities as being "Marxist infiltrated." In one instance, the DINA left an injured victim outside of the headquarters of the Comité para la Paz. Silva took the doctors report, which showed that the man had been tortured to Pinochet himself, and asked him to take steps to curb the DINA. This had no effect and the DINA continued to "disappear," kill and torture people.
Under Pinochet, the government instituted a curfew the purpose of which psychologist and activist Elizabeth Lira explained, saying, "If you were trapped at home, it was easy to deny what you couldn't see." While many people were content to deny the violence that was taking place or were too afraid, some people protested. Protesting only intensified the pain brought on by not knowing what had happened to relatives and friends.
Terror Abroad
Within Chile, the DINA's activities did not just include Chilean citizens. Charles Horman Jr., an American expatriot and Allende sympathizer was among other non Chileans who were detained, tortured and executed.
The DINA extended itself outside of Chile to include exiles who were anti Pinochet. In September of 1974, General Carlos Prats and his wife were killed in Argentina. Prats had been suspected of attempting to oust Pinochet. A little over a year later, Bernardo Leighton, a Christian Democrat, and his wife were shot in Rome. Both survived the attack.
A memo dated September 16, 1976 from Contreras to Pinochet provides one answer for this violence. In the note, Contreras requested $600,000 "for reasons that I consider indispensable," including, "the neutralization of the [Chilean] government junta's principle adversaries abroad, especially in Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, the USA and Italy." Later, these countries would witness assassination or assassination attempts linked to the DINA.
On September 21, 1976, the DINA carried out, what may be considered, its most "audacious" act of terrorism yet. Acting under direct orders from Contreras, DINA agents detonated a bomb in Orlando Letelier's car, killing Letelier and his American assistant, Ronni Moffit. Letelier, who had worked as foreign minister and ambassador to the US under Allende, was seen as one of Pinochet's staunchest critics abroad. At first, US officials could not believe that the Chilean secret police would undertake such an overt attack on American soil. As they scrutinized the evidence, though, they could find only one explanation - the DINA.
What the US knew about human rights' abuses by the DINA
The United States was involved in covert activities in Chile since the 1950's. As was mentioned, the CIA gave money and arms to groups in order to discredit Allende and later to overthrow him. CIA activities in Chile did not end when Pinochet took office. The CIA remained in Chile to monitor the situation. The information they gathered also concerned human rights' abuses.
The CIA was aware of violations in 1973, but in January of 1974, they gave contacts and agents in Chile orders to obtain information concerning suspected violations of human rights and attempt to influence the government to end all "repressive measures," especially torture. The US discovered that some of these contacts and agents were "involved in, knew about or covered up" human rights' abuses. The CIA "admonished" those involved and reported them according to procedure, but admitted that if their standards had been what they are today, many of these individuals would have been fired.
One of the contacts of the CIA was none other than Colonel Contreras. They intended to pay him, but due to an existing policy they discovered that they could not. However, there was a one-time payment that went through due to "miscommunications." The CIA wanted information about "Operation Condor," a coalition of anti-communist groups in Europe and other South American countries that arrested known leftists for repatriation and also monitored the movements of leftist guerillas. In 1976, the CIA approached Contreras and asked about "Operation Condor." The Colonel confirmed its existence but denied its involvement in the terrorism and assassinations abroad. They remained in contact with him even after they determined that he stood in the way of a fair human rights' policy in Chile. CIA contact with Contreras dwindled until his removal from the DINA in 1977.
On January 17, 1974, the Chilean government released a circular regarding policies for the capture and care of prisoners as dictated by th e 1949 Geneva Convention. The United States urged Contreras to get his agents to comply with the policies stated. It was later determined that this circular was a "public relations ruse."
There is some confusion as to what exactly the CIA knew in conjunction with the death of American Charles Horman Jr. Prior to his arrest, Horman went to the American embassy for assistance. They were not sure whether his request was sincere or whether it was part of a left-wing plot that he was involved in. Later, the CIA would claim that they did not know that Horman's life was in danger. Horman was captured in a routine military sweep and was found to be in possession of "extremist" papers. He was detained at the National Stadium in Santiago where he was interrogated and eventually shot. Horman did not have any papers on him and the Chilean officials involved in his kidnapping and death claimed they did not know that he was American even though he spoke poor Spanish and could not answer their questions. Some of the declassified CIA documents mention Colonel Rafael Augustin Gonzalez-Verdugo. Gonzalez claimed to have been present at Horman's sentencing. He mentioned another man who he believed to be American because of his "dress." The plaintiffs, Horman's family, deduced that this man was a CIA agent.
After the murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffit in Washington DC, the FBI launched an investigation. They discovered that the man who had built the bomb was Michael Townley, an American born man who had moved to Chile in the 1960's. Townley, always interested in the right-wing organizations that had started under Allende's presidency, was quick to join the DINA and shortly became one of its prized and most dedicated agents. He had attempted to get a job with the CIA in Chile, "which initially considered using him as an operative, but never pursued the contact." He did work, on occasion, as an informant for the CIA. Of his role in the explosion Townley said, "He was a soldier, and I was a soldier." I received an order, and I carried out the order to the best of my ability." Eventually, he was convicted in the United States and served three years in prison.
The Fall of the DINA
"Thanks to the CNI, you sleep peacefully." General Pinochet
Contreras was not to remain in power indefinitely. The Letelier/Moffit murders had caused concern among Chilean governmental officials. The navy and the air force pulled their members from the DINA and advisors warned Pinochet that Contreras' rash actions could endanger his own political career. In 1977, Pinochet removed Contreras as head of the DINA (although he promoted him to the rank of general) and effectively dissolved the organization.
This crime also changed the stance of the United States toward Chile. Before, Henry Kissinger had indicated support for Pinochet's regime but advised them to do something about their continuing violation of human rights so as to look better to the US Congress. It also inspired Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Thomas Harkin, both democrats, to increase their efforts at banning US aid to Chile. Since 1974, the Ford administration had refused to discontinue aid, but in 1976, Congress approved their proposals. Under President Carter, excoriation of Pinochet's regime increased with US representatives to the UN voting on resolutions to cut loans to Chile.
Pinochet created the Central Nacional de Informaciones (CNI) to take over the job of the DINA. He put General Odlanier Mena, a man who had long criticized Contreras' harsh tactics, in charge. Despite a new name and a new director, the CNI continued to be influenced by Contreras. The CNI agents who had formerly been part of the DINA were still loyal to Contreras and acted as informants on Mena and the other "soft liners." Gradually, tales of abuses by the CNI leaked out. Politicians who had once ignored human rights' abuses had learned to take them seriously and began to criticize Mena. MIRistas were becoming bolder and killed an army intelligence officer which prompted a call for the "preventative work" of the DINA. Pinochet replaced Mena with General Humberto Gordon who was in close contact with Contreras.
More murders and financial scams followed, including one where an organization linked to Contreras had illegally made millions in dollars in tax refunds by filing fraudulent receipts for exported copper. Some of the receipts were written using the names of some of the disappeared. The CNI was finally disbanded after Pinochet was voted out of office in 1989 and stepped down in 1990.
Although Pinochet gave himself and his generals immunity to prosecution in Chile, Contreras was sentenced to seven years in prison for the murders of Letelier and Moffit on November 12, 1993. Contreras asserted that he was acting under orders from General Pinochet in "every action that he undertook."
INTRODUCTION: PINOCHET'S ARREST
On 16th October 1998, the human rights status quo was shaken. The arrest, in London, of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte came as a stunning surprise to both his friends and his foes. The British Government found itself in a political storm at home and in a diplomatic nightmare with Chile - a country which had experienced a dark age of dictatorship under the General and which its government, at least, seemed determined to forget.
Opinion was deeply divided. Prominent figures in Britain spoke out strongly both for and against Pinochet's arrest, and the divisions and painful memories of the past in Chile were rekindled. The eternal play between idealism for the rights of the individual and the expediency of real politick was suddenly brought home and into sharp relief. A legal and political decision had to be made one way or the other. Which would win the day, the striving for human rights or the pragmatism of international relations?
Sovereign Immunity: Could extradition proceedings even begin?
A Spanish judge, Baltasar Garzón, had presented Britain with an extradition warrant to bring Pinochet to trial in Spain. The warrant accused the General of human rights abuses under his dictatorship, and Britain's High Court did accept that he had a prima facie case to answer. However, the High Court also accepted the main defence presented by Pinochet's lawyers - that since he was Chile's head of state at the time of the alleged crimes, English and international law granted him sovereign immunity from prosecution. And since, also, the Chilean government protested at the arrest, refusing to exercise its power to waive Pinochet's immunity, the High Court ruled that it had no legal right to begin extradition proceedings against him.
Despite the High Court's unanimity and certainty of its decision, leave to appeal against it was granted, in view of the international importance of the case. Dramatically, the appeal in Britain's highest court, the House of Lords, succeeded, this time ruling by the narrowest three to two majority that crimes against humanity could not be considered as the normal acts of a head of state. Therefore, Pinochet's claimed sovereign immunity did not extend to the allegations spelled out in the Spanish extradition warrant, and extradition proceedings could commence after all.
But the plot thickened. It was revealed that one of the law lords, Lord Hoffman - who had been one of the three to judge against Pinochet - had strong links with Amnesty International, a human rights campaigning group that had contributed towards the case against Pinochet's claim of immunity. As a result, a team of law lords took the highly unusual step of annulling its own ruling: the risk of bias in Lord Hoffmann's deliberations meant that even if his decision were just and impartial, doubts would remain and justice would not be seen to have been done.
And so, as General Pinochet spent an unexpected Christmas in Wentworth, Surrey, another team of law lords was selected to re-hear the case. This repeat hearing in the House of Lords ended on 4th February, and we await the third - and presumably final - judgement with baited breath...
...On 24th March 1999, the law lords announced a verdict, by six to one, that General Pinochet was, indeed, not entitled to absolute immunity from the legal proceedings of our domestic courts. However, this was only from 8th December 1988 and only regarding certain of Spain's draft charges. The lords now decided - contrary to their earlier judgement - that before this date Pinochet does have immunity from legal proceedings in our courts.
Bizarrely, the lords' reasoning had become quite different. Previously, they had argued that Pinochet did not have state immunity because crimes against humanity could not be regarded as the actions of a head of state; only actions of the state brought immunity with them. Since this was an argument based on the scope of immunity as such, this judgement said in effect that any former head of state lost their immunity once they engaged in crimes against humanity. Now, however, the restriction of immunity was argued for in a more clearly legally grounded way, by explicit reference to an international treaty signed, ratified and - in theory - made effective by, among others, Britain, Chile and Spain. According to the law lords, immunity was removed from crimes covered by the United Nations Convention Against Torture when this convention came into effect for the states concerned. It came into effect in Britain on 8th December 1988: therefore, Pinochet had immunity before that date (law does not normally act retrospectively) but no immunity after that date for crimes covered by the convention.
The result of this was that most of the charges drafted by Spain could not be levelled against Pinochet in our courts for the purpose of extradition proceedings. This was either because they related to events prior to 8th December 1988 or because they were not crimes covered by the Convention Against Torture. Of the 32 charges, only two now remained - one of torture and one of conspiracy to torture.
The law lords therefore decided that the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, would have to reconsider his earlier Authority to Proceed with moves to extradite Pinochet. As the ruling on the basis of which Straw had issued his first Authority had now been overruled, he would have to consider the case afresh.
The case against Pinochet was now significantly weakened. Almost immediately, the Spanish prosecutor Baltasar Garzón sent further allegations to the Crown Prosecution Service, allegations which fall within the new criteria for Pinochet's lack of immunity: Garzón presented 43 new cases of torture and conspiracy to torture occuring after 8th December 1988. Secondly, Garzón argued that all unresolved cases of disappearance are regarded, under the 1992 UN Declaration on the Protection of Disappeared Persons, as currently open cases of torture.
On the other side, General Pinochet's lawyers also responded on two fronts. Firstly, they applied for a judicial review of Jack Straw's earlier Authority to Proceed. Secondly, they applied for a writ of habeas corpus to release Pinochet from house arrest. However, the High Court adjourned both of these hearings until 15th April, to give the Home Secretary time to reconsider his Authority to Proceed. Lord Justice Laws reasoned that some order should be maintained in the legal developments: going ahead immediately with the application for habeas corpus, "might allow Gen Pinochet to be discharged and leave the country without the Secretary of State having the opportunity to reconsider the merits of this matter."
Extradition: An executive decision
Despite the reduction in the number of charges remaining after the law lords' second ruling against Pinochet, on 15th April Jack Straw gave the go-ahead for extradition proceedings by issuing a new Authority to Proceed. The Home Secretary made the judgement that the remaining charges still meant that Pinochet appeared to be legally extraditable. Furthermore, while the Home Secretary had the executive power to exercise his "wide" discretion to block extradition proceedings, he saw no reason to do so, neither on the humanitarian grounds of Pinochet's alleged ill health - "it does not appear that Senator Pinochet is unfit to stand trial", Straw concluded - nor on political grounds, such as "the stability of Chile and its future democracy" or "the UK national interest".
Pinochet's lawyers responded to this second Authority to Proceed by applying to the High Court for a judicial review of Straw's decision. However, on 27th May, the application was turned down. Despite having the legal option to make a second, similar application, on 7th June Pinochet's legal team decided against this. Extradition proceedings would finally commence.
The extradition hearings began on 25th September at Bow Street Magistrate's Court, under Ronald Bartle, Deputy Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, and lasted for four days. He ruled, on 8th October, that under the 1989 Extradition Act, it was clear that Pinochet could indeed be extradited to Spain, subject to the Home Secretary's final decision. Bartle allowed the inclusion of the further charges added by Garzón since the Lords' judgment: this brought the extraditable charges to 35, one a wide-ranging charge of conspiracy to torture and 34 charges of torture. Furthermore, he ruled that charges of conspiracy and of disappearance prior to 8th December 1988 could be included, because "conspiracy is a continuing offence", and "the effect on the families of those who disappeared can amount to mental torture".
But even this was by no means the end of the story. As well as Pinochet's lawyers, on 22nd October, appealing against the Bow Street magistrate's decision (in the form of an application for a writ of habeas corpus), on 5th November Jack Straw, under pressure to consider releasing Pinochet on health grounds, asked him to submit to independent medical tests.
THE CRIMES: PINOCHET'S CHILE
"Every so often, democracy has to be bathed in blood." "There is not a leaf in this country which I do not move."[1]
From a legal point of view, England's courts have had to decide whether General Pinochet has a case to answer and whether they have the jurisdiction to begin pursuing that case by commencing extradition proceedings against him. It must be remembered that the High Court accepted that Pinochet does have a case to answer[2], and his defence lawyers have never seriously denied this fact. The evidence of massive human rights abuses by Pinochet is so overwhelming that he can only effectively be defended on the legal technicality of his claimed sovereign immunity under English and international law.
The High Court was told of Chile's official, authoritative and thorough report on the systematic abuse of human rights that was carried out with the full knowledge of General Pinochet.[3] Pinochet's direct rule came to an end when he was defeated in the plebiscite of 5th October 1988, and the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (or Rettig Commission) was set up under President Patricio Aylwin by his decree of 25th April 1990.[4] The Commission's findings were presented to the nation on 4th March 1991[5]:
Although the Chilean panel's report is not yet widely available, its publication is bound to have [a] cathartic impact on a sophisticated society in which many members of the elite refused to believe that the authorities could perpetrate such horrors.
The report, based on nine months of testimony and research, describes several stages of repression. In the weeks after the military seized power in a coup Sept. 11, 1973, thousands of Chileans sympathetic to the socialist government were detained. Many were tortured, and several hundred were tried and executed by military war tribunals. A woman described the corpse of her son, the manager of a state cement plant, who turned himself in after the coup and died in custody five weeks later: "He was missing one eye, his nose was torn off, one ear was separated and hanging, there were marks of deep burns on his neck and face, his mouth was very swollen." In the next stage, the army's secret police squads waged a "systematic campaign to exterminate" leftist dissidents from 1974 to 1977, the report states. Inside clandestine prisons, people were tortured with electric shocks, choking, confinement and even animal rape. There were 957 victims who never reappeared and are presumed dead.[6]
The report was strongly critical of the military's claim that Chile was in a state of war after the coup, which had been the justification of the continued activity of military courts. It also criticised the military courts for imposing retroactive punishment for actions that had occurred before they were made illegal, for refusing to make the bodies of those executed available to their families, and for "infraction of fundamental legal norms and essential ethical principles." The commission was still more critical of the civilian judiciary, which, it said, "because of the constitution, the law, and the nature of its functions" was the state institution "responsible for the protection of such rights." It accused the judiciary of "worsening the process of the systematic violation of human rights, both by not offering protection to the persons whose cases were denounced to it, and by providing the agents of repression with increasing certainty that they would not be punished for their criminal acts." Examples cited by the commission included indefinite delays in responding to habeas corpus requests and inaction on persons held incommunicado for periods of up to a year.[7]
Pinochet's military junta had justified its intervention as a response to a breakdown in law and order under the government of President Salvador Allende. And yet, they succeeded in instituting a breakdown that, by comparison, made life under Allende a model of socialist paradise. If this were the price of fighting socialism, then "Better Red than dead" took on a new, humanitarian meaning. Is it any wonder, then, that General Pinochet became an icon of American-inspired capitalist aggression, after the revelations of the US state, CIA and corporate contribution to Allende's violent downfall.[8]
The Rettig Commission was mandated to investigate only cases of human rights abuses that had resulted in death. (We shall return to this point below.) Even so, the Report set out the following statistics: Out of a total of 2920 such cases investigated by the Commission, a definite conclusion was reached on 2279. The vast majority of these 2279 cases concerned individuals who had been killed by the state; in other words, murdered by those very people - from the police, intelligence services and the armed forces - who, in principle, were supposed to be protecting citizens from violence. The Commission received a further 508 cases which did not fall within its mandate. It also received 449 names with no accompanying information; the Commission decided - perhaps rather curiously - that for these, therefore, "there was no basis for carrying out an investigation."[9]
On the recommendation of the Rettig report, a follow-up organisation, the Reparation and Reconciliation Corporation, was established on 8th February 1992. Its original mandate was to run until 15th July 1993, but this was extended several times.[10] Eventually reporting in 1996, it took over the
continuing investigations on the 641 cases the Rettig Commission had been unable to resolve, and receiving and investigating those cases which had not been presented during the Rettig Commission's one year period of operation... [It] officially recognised a further 123 'disappearances' and 776 extrajudicial executions and death under torture during the military period. Combined with the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission this brought the number of 'disappearances' to 1,102 and extrajudicial executions and death under torture to 2,095, making a total of 3,197 cases that were officially recognised by the Chilean state.[11]
References:
General Pinochet, quoted in New Internationalist, No.174, August 1987, Visions of Freedom: A Journey Through Pinochet's Chile, p.6.
"The magistrate [who issued the provisional arrest warrant for General Pinochet] must be able to satisfy himself that it is a proper case in which to issue a summons... This was very much a question for the stipendiary magistrate and I find nothing in the facts here to suggest a challengeable exercise of discretion." [Emphasis added.] Regina v Evans and Another, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte Regina v Bartle, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte In re Pinochet Ugarte, QB, 28.10.98, 38-39; http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/cs_home.htm (Select High Court, then Divisional Court, then case by date.)
Ibid., 57-58. This point is further substantiated below.
Cautiously, Chile Investigates Political Killings, The Washington Post, 3.6.90, p.6; Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, trans. Phillip E.Berryman, Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993, vol.1, p.5. (This is the official English translation of the Report, hereafter Rettig Report.)
Daan Bronkhorst, Truth and Reconciliation: Obstacles and opportunities for human rights, Amsterdam: Amnesty International Dutch Section, 1995, pp.19-20, 23.
Report on Torture in Chile Undermines Military's Denials, Boston Globe, 10.3.91, p.4
Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1993, p.196.
Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 97-99, 110-111, 128-131, 168-203, 242-247, 304-305, 371-373; William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. military and CIA interventions since World War II, Montreal, New York and London: Black Rose Books, 1998, pp. 206-215.
Rettig Report, vol.2, p.899.
Transition at the Crossroads: Human Rights Violations under Pinochet Remain the Crux, Amnesty International report AMR 22/01/96, March 1996.
Ibid.
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