IMG90

*

Notes

19.    Ibid.

20.    Ernst Mach, op. cit., p. 54.

;t. F.rna l.csky, Die Winter medizinische Schnie im 19 jahrhundcrt (Graz and Colognc), 1965), p. 535.

22.    Ernst Mach, Grundlinien der Lehre von den Bewcgutigsempfindungcn (Leipzig, 1875), p. 54.

23.    AOS (New York, 1959), p. 126.

24.    CAOS (Chicago, 1897), pp. 68-69.

25.    Ernst Mach, Einleitung in die Helm/ioltz’sche Musikjheorie: Popular jur Musi ker dargcstcllt (Graz, 1866).

26.    AOS. pp. 297, 305.

27.    Ibid.

28.    Edwin G. Boring, A Hi story oj l:\pciimental Psychology (New York,

*957). P- 309-

29.    Sil'. 54 (1866), 143

30.    Ernst Mach, “Bcmcrkungcn uber intcrmitnrcndc Lichtrcizc," Archi o jur Anatomie, Physiologie, ttnd wissenschajtiiche Medictn, n.v. (1865), 634.

31.    Ibid.

32.    R. Jung, "Ernst Mach ais Sinncsphy.siologe," Symposinm (Freiburg iin Brcisgau, 1967), p. 134.

33.    SOM (La Sallc, 111., 1960), p. 560.

34.    Boring, op. cit., p. 352.

35.    Ibid., p. 354.

36.    Jung, op. cit.

37.    Ernst Mach, "Sonic Skctchcs in COmparative Animal and Humań Psychol-ogy," Open Court. 32 (1918), 363.

38.    Ewald Hering, On Memory and the Specific Energies oj the Nereous System (Chicago, 1902), p. 21.

39.    Ibid., p. 27.

40.    Ernst Mach, "Einige veglcichcndc ticr-und mcnschcnpsychologischo Skiz-zen," Natur wissenschajtiiche Wochenschrift. 15 (1916), 241-247.

41.    Edwin G. Boring considcrcd Hcring’s theory of "unconscious memory" as "iriic" (op. cit., p. 354), but bc that as n inay, as a "scientific” link with tra-ditional German Naturphilosophie it and devolpmcnts from it have continucd to havc a rcmarkablc influence in German conternporary thought, cspccially among relapsed quantum theorists (sec chap. 19).

42.    According to Theodor Ackcrmann Antiquariat, Bibliothek Ernst Mach, Tcil II, Katalog 636 (Munich, 1960), the only book by Brentano in Mach’s libr ary was Untersuchungen sur Sinnespsychologie (Leipzig, 1907). Mach‘s aversion to rcading Brentano’s books was probably bascd on his idcntification of him as a Catholic "theologian” and of his idcas as "inctaphysic.il."

43.    Wilhelm Wundt, Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologie (Leipzig, »874); Franz Brentano, Psychologie tom empirischen Standpun/^t (Leipzig, 1874).

44.    Boring, op. cit., pp. 360-361.

45.    Ibid., p. 361.

46.    CUE (Chicago, 1911), p. 91.

47.    AOS (New York, 1959), p. 18.

48.    l^eitgedanken (Leipzig, 1919), p. 16.

49.    AOS. p. 340.

Notes

50.    Mach*s basie problem with respect to space and time was to rcconcilc the "natwism" of Muller and Hering with the "psychophysical paralklism" of Foch ner, and latcr, with his own vcrsion of paralklism. Mach nevcr rcally suc-ccedcd.

51.    For Mach the physical world was the most "cconomicaT maihenutica! dcscription of the "rcal," i.e., the physiological, world. The metric world m-duded all the idealized mathcmatical possibilities of which the physical world was only one.

52.    The science of physiology was ‘physical" in that it employed "cconomicaT mathcmatical dcscription to dcscribe sensations related to or within tląc human body, but the physiological world as something nuumaihcmatical and non-idealized was not "physical" for Mach.

53.    To turn "psychology" into “physiology" mcant to turn clusive, not-yet-measured sensations related to or within the human body into mcasurable sen-sations capable of bcing described in cconomical, mathcmatical (i.e., "physical") terms. A scrious problem in Mach’s approach was that •physical," besides mean-ing “employing the methods of physics,” also sometimes mcant "rclating sensa-tions to other than the human body.”

54.    As a notion sensation in the "larger sensc" includcd eyerything that could be referred to with the possible cxccption of relations. In the “oarrower sense" sensation as a notion referred to what could be rcliably measured as opposcd to "psychologkaT phenomena that wcrc not yet capable of being so measured.

55.    AOS, p. 10.

56.    COE. p. 87.

57.    Ibid., p. 94.

58.    S Sr G (La Salle, III., 1960), p. 10.

59.    Ibid., pp. 30-31.

6c. Ibid., p. 31.

61.    For a rather sharp criticism of Mach’s theory of time, sec Mario Bunge, "Mach’s Critiąuc of Newtonian Mcchanics," American Journal oj Physics. 34 (1966), 586-588.

62.    AOS, pp. 246-249.

63.    Ibid., pp. 248, 249.

6ą. E& I (Leipzig, 1917), p. 43T

65.    l'WV (Leipzig, 1923), p. 495.

66.    AOS. p. 82.

67.    Ibid., p. 100.

68.    Ibid., p. 7.

69.    Ernst Mach to Joseph Pctzoldt, Vatcrstcttcn, March 20, 1914.

70.    AOS, p. 46. 'I differ front Comie in holding that the psychological facts arc, as sourccs of knowledge, at least as important as the physical faefc.

71.    Watson rcjcctcd "psychophysics" bccausc of its rcliance on introspccuor. and ignored the "mind," "consciousness," and the "ego.” But tgnoring such entities was quitc a difTerent matter froin Mach's drastic phenomenalistic trejt ment of them. To claim that the "sclf could not l*c łcicntirtcally treated was one thing, but to deny that "1" c.\ist was fardter than most pcople, especnl \ Christians, wcrc willing to go.

72.    Boring, op. cit.. p. 645: "Watson . . . faited to proside hi* case wtth 3 rigorous epistcmology."

331