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118 Brala 6WrA Sending untalieited cornmereai Communications 119

118 Brala 6WrA Sending untalieited cornmereai Communications 119

'Przych    * ^;

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which, if ii is not an offer, i* nol legally bmding according to Art. 7i ^ thc Civ.C\* Docs this racan that thc legislator intends to introduce a ban q-sending offers on-linc, in accordancc with Art. 6 of thc law on protectin. cenain consumcr righls which mentions making ołTers for a dcal? Given wording of thc rcgulauon, no point-blank answer can be g»ven herc. Ther_c have bccn approachcs to the eflfect that this norm should also apply ^ Information that has thc fcatures of an ofier.* The rcsult is that cntrcpicacur, shy away from cmailing oflers to consumcrs for fcar of brcaking thc law Our discussion of Art. 10 of l.r.s.e. would be incompiclc without tg. counting for the adjectivc “unsolicited", pertaining to commcrcial inf_w. mation. There is no cxpb'dt legislalion regarding that issuc. Point 2 Art. 1Q however, spedfies when commcrcial information is “solicitod." This happe^ when thc rccipicnt "cxprcsses his conscnt to rcccivc such information particularly by making his address avadablc.” ‘I his leads us to the conclusion that information is unsolicited when the rccipicnt has not conscnted to rcccivc it. lt docs not sccm necessary for thc addrcsscc to always explicitly dcclare his willi ngness to uocept a lellcr. llowcvcr. this raises certain doubti 1 am of thc opinion that the conscnt docs not ncccssarily havc to be cxplicit. Bchaviour that clcarly indicales thc addrcsscc's willingncss should sufficc. An instanoc of such bchaviour, indicativc of thc redpienfs consem, is quotcd in thc rclcvant legislalion; this instancc is making your addrei availablc, in whalevcr form, for cxamplc by placing it on your own website,’¹ There are difrerent approachcs to thc problem, though. D. Kas for instancc. opines that thc conscnt „should be granted clcarly and expłia£ ly”." This condusion. in KasprzyckTs opinion, stems dircctly from Art. 4 p 1 of thc l.r.s.e. The rcgulation in qucstion has it that if the law rcquircs tłut the redpienfs consent be givcn, his conscnt shall not be assumed or dcducoi from a dcclaration of willingncss pertaining to another matter. A comprchts-sive discussion of this opinion is outside thc scopc of this paper. Let us jusi rcmark herc that there is a differencc bctwccn assumed or dcduccd acccptaa-cc and cascs w herc willingncss is exprcssed, albcit unclcarly, so intcrprctative rules have to be employed in order to establish what was mcant Assump tion, by definition, leads to a sort of fallacy, whereby a situation it conjecturcd to have happened, without ncccssarily having happencd in rek life. The other scenario has it that a dedaration has bccn madę, even thougi its sense is unclcar and has to be cxplicatcd.

' Aocording to Art 71 Civ C. commeroal idvertił«rteiUł. prioe KiU and ołber rr.esuft or without & spcbficd &ddreiicc are in ihc c*vc of doubu interpretuj not t% oflers. but u inv)U!ioQt to nule a dcal.

* Sec D. Kasprzycki, op. ctt, p. 504.

*• Itfićrm, p. 506 tecmt to be of a diflcreiu opemoo.

° Ibktrm.

rv

Ąft. 10 p. 3 of thc law on rendering scrvices on-linc has it that sending _aas0licitcd commcrcial oonient constitutcs a brcach of thc prindple of unfair p^npetition. This rcgulation raises thc queslion of thc conditions that havc _w be met in order to acccpt responsibility for such adion. Somc doubts „jie herc, viz. whelher the vcry fact of sending commcrdal contcnt suffices to accuae an entrcprcncur of having commiltcd an act of unfair competition, ot whether all the conditions listed in Art. 3 and 16 p. 1 item 5 of thc li.u.f- havc to be met.

fwo stands sccm to be fcasible here. It sccms justifiablc to coocludc tbat the intention of the legislator as exprcsscd in Art. 10 of thc l.r.s.o:

|. arbilrarily elassiftet an act as going against thc rules of fair com-petilion as such'¹ or

2. mereły constitutcs a duc for thc court of law to thc cffect that sending unsolicited commcrcial contcnt may (or may not) be an instancc of dśloyal competition. The finał judgement ought to be madę in accordancc with thc criteria listed in thc l.c.u.c of 1993. It should not fuil to takc into account thc aim of the rcgulation as spccified in Art. 1 and responsibility pranises as indicated in Art. 3 and 16 thereof.

The issuc under scruliny here is subjcct to sevcral mterpretations. Clcarly, i Sterał interpretation of thc reguiaiions containcd in thc l.r.s.c. will not yickl expccted result. It is so as on thc one hand Art. 10 of the l.r.s.e. is iITirmatis-c (thc action described in p. 1, that is sending unsolicited cotnmcr-cal contcnt addresscd at a detined rccipicnt by clcctronic means constitutcs in act of unfair competition). On thc other hand, though, the legislator apressly suggests rccourse to thc law on eliminating unfair competition, by making dircct referenoes to this vcry rcgulation Point 2 Art. 10 says that thc bcfaaviour under anałysis is an cxample of unfair competition as defined in thc Lc.uc. of April 16*. 1993. Thus thc wording of thc law signifies that i charge of unfair competition rcquircs that conditions spccified in thc l-c.u.c. bive to be met. There are other arguments for thc corrcctncss of this assumption. Unarguably. the 1-e.u.c. is aimed at fighting cconomic disloyalty, understood not in an abslract way, but as bchaviour running counter to jood practicc that impinges on economic relations. Whether we can speak of ditloyalty in a givcn casc or not, can only be determincd by legał regulations on eradicating unfair competition. According to thesc, a charge of disloyal ompetition cntails thc following (sec Art. 3 of thc l.c.u.c.):

Sc* c.r. P. Waglowski, of eit. as wcll as X. Konarski, in: Komentarz do usuwy *Marfcm*Hi usług drogij eltlarotacuu) [On ihe law on rcndcrioji *«rvic«s on-linc - a comrr.cc-U0l. Warszawa 2002. p 119.