TERRORISM

M

ARY

K

ALDOR

I. What is the Problem?

The official US definition of terrorism refers to violence undertaken by non-state actors
against non-combatants

1

. However, the problem is broader than this. What we should be

worried about is the rise of extremist religious and nationalist/ethnic networks, composed
of both state and non-state actors, who deliberately inflict large-scale violence against
civilians (genocide, massacres, population displacement, communal riots, suicide
bombers) and who are often engaged in all kinds of illicit activities (drug trade, human
trafficking, money laundering, illegal arms sales, and so on). Although most public
attention is focused on Islamic groups, this phenomenon can be found in all major world
religions (Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist) and also among many national or
ethnic groups. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between religious and
nationalist groups since national identity is often equated with religion, e.g. Catholics and
Protestants in Ireland or Hindu and Sikh nationalists.

Although extremist religious and nationalist groups are not new – many groups have their
origins in the 1920’s or 1930’s - this combination of political extremism (exclusivism or
fundamentalism

1

), violence against civilians, and criminality has largely arisen in the last

two decades. It is to be explained partly in terms of the decline in secular left ideologies,
particularly socialism and post-colonial nationalism, and partly in terms of the growing
economic and social insecurity associated with globalization. On the one hand, political
leaders use fear and prejudice as a mobilizing tool when other tools have failed. Often it
was secular leaders who were the first to make use of religious or national ideologies. On
the other hand, these leaders found a ready response among uprooted individuals. Typical
recruits to these movements are unemployed young men, often migrants, either from
countryside to town or from South to West, who have experienced the loss of ties to their
places of origin and yet do not feel integrated in their new homes, and who lack sufficient
income to marry. Membership in militant groups provides a source of security (through
associated NGOs or local religious centres) a source of income (through criminal or
semi-criminal activities) as well as a sense of moral worth, purpose and adventure.

The ideology of these groups is both modern and anti-modern. They are modern in that
they aspire to state power in the name of religion or ethnicity and they have a modernist
view of state power. They still believe in an absolutist notion of sovereignty and reject
the conditionality that has accompanied globalization. They believe that other religions or
ethnicities can somehow be excluded from their bordered territory. The global Islamic
groups, often connected to Al Qaeda tend to favor regional Islamic states. Thus Al Qaeda
favors a Muslim caliphate for the whole of the Middle East, while Jemaah Islamiya, a
network spread across Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore favors an

Asian Muslim caliphate. The South Asian organization Jamaat-e-Islami similarly wants
to unite Muslims.

But they are anti-modern in their rejection of the doubt and questioning that has
accompanied modernity; they cannot accept that human reason is superior to sacred
knowledge. They are also nostalgic for some imagined ‘pure’ past or ‘golden age. They
tend to be oppressive towards women and homophobic. Above all, they all share a deep
belief in the notion of struggle. All of these groups have a clearly defined notion of ‘us’
and ‘them’, ‘good ‘ and ‘evil’, of jihad, cosmic war, or Armageddon, and they often
celebrate epic battles and heroic warriors.

These groups deliberately inflict large-scale violence against civilians. So-called terrorist
groups in the 1950s and 1960s tended to focus on strategic targets (key officials,
important installations like post offices or television towers), while guerrilla groups
aimed to capture territory or strategic assets. Violence against civilians may be a direct
form of political control, through eliminating or expelling people of a different ethnicity
or religion, as in the former Yugoslavia. Or it may be ‘symbolic’, as on September 11
2001. Mark Juergensmayer uses the term ‘performance act’, to describe symbolic
violence designed for maximum media coverage –‘stunning, abnormal and outrageous
murders carried out in a way that graphically displays the power of violence –set within
grand scenarios of conflict and proclamation.’

1

And in both cases, it is a way of

confirming the notion of struggle, mobilizing extremist political sentiment, and squeezing
the space for moderate opinion –creating fear and hatred rather than a response to fear
and hatred.

Typically these groups are organized both through more traditional hierarchical structures
and through global networks linked to Diasporas. Many of these networks involve state
structures or bits of state structures. Often they amount to a kind of parallel society,
involving different components for finance, welfare, education or communication. Many
of these groups have special schools (Madrassahs, the new Hindu schools in tribal areas
or Christian schools in America) and humanitarian NGOs who provide social security to,
for example, newly arrived immigrants. They make use of the ‘new media’ –Internet,
circulation of videocassettes, TV and radio. Finance often consists of criminal activities,
Diaspora support, or plunder.

1

Although these networks are world-wide, it is the ‘black holes’ created by long running
conflicts like Afghanistan, Chechnya, even Northern Ireland where this combination of
extremism and criminality persists and where cultures of violence are nurtured.

II. What Can be Done?

Any strategy for countering these groups has to be both global and local. In particular,
there has to be a focus on the ‘black holes’ – the conflicts that continue to represent a
flashpoint for grievance and an environment for reproducing the combination of
extremism and criminality.

Such a strategy has to start with the reconstruction of legitimacy both through the re-
establishment of rule of law and through more inclusive ideologies that offer an
alternative to extremism. Any actions therefore taken to deal with terrorism have to be
undertaken within the framework of international law and have to be aimed at countering
the ideology of ‘fear and hatred’ with a genuine effort to win ‘hearts and minds’.

The big risk of using the language of war and attacking states, which sponsor terrorism,
as the Bush Administration is doing, is that this feeds into the terrorists own perception of
struggle. War implies legitimate killing by agents of the state whereas terrorism is viewed
as criminal violence by non-state actors. But there is a fine line between heroes, who kill
in war, and murderers. The problem is that these groups themselves define what they are
doing as war. Thus, the language of war and, above all, the destructiveness of war can
perversely end up legitimating the actions of the terrorists. For example, the Palestinian
groups –Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or the Al Aqsa Brigades - are all included in the State
Department’s list of international terrorist groups; since the beginning of the second
Intifada, they have killed 781 Israelis. On the other hand, the Israeli forces, who are state
actors and are therefore considered legitimate, have killed 2085 Palestinians, mostly
civilians.

1

The Israelis (and the Americans) may regard the Palestinian groups as

terrorists but for the latter, this is considered a war of self-defense and each Israeli strike
adds further to their perception of legitimacy. In much the same way, we are told that the
minimum estimate for casualties in the recent war in Iraq is around 13,000

1

and this is

low by the standards of war. But by the standards of terrorism, it is extremely high.

It may be necessary to use military means, for example in destroying terrorist camps or
protecting civilians but any military action must be viewed as law enforcement rather
than war. This is not just a matter of procedure, that the use of military force should be
approved through due process, for example the United Nations Security Council; it is also
a matter of means. Law enforcement starts from the assumption of human equality. The
lives of soldiers cannot be privileged over the lives of the civilians they are supposed to
protect. Hence, military force must be used on the same principles as policing; soldiers
are expected to risk their lives to save others.

The importance of means also applies to intelligence, policing and other legal procedures.
The various counter-terrorist legislation in Britain and the United States allows
procedures to be adopted, such as detention without charges that potentially contravene
human rights. Indeed, the recent report of the Office of the Inspector General in the US
Department of Justice makes alarming reading.

1

The term ‘terrorist’ has also been used to

legitimize repressive behavior in a number of countries; it is used for example, in
Australia against asylum-seekers or against various secessionist movements in different
countries.

1

The risk is not just that this behavior can further fuel anger and resentment among
potential recruits to extremist causes, it is also the challenge to our own civil liberties and

our claim to offer an alternative ideology. How to balance the needs of counter-terrorism
with civil liberties does require much more careful attention both by scholars and
policymakers.

Countering the ideology of these groups also requires grass roots political mobilization.
This means helping to create space for inclusive civil society groups especially in areas,
like the ‘black holes’ created by conflict, which are the most likely recruiting areas for
militants. Women’s groups are particularly important in countering the gender
discrimination of extremist ideologies.

The global mobilization against the war in Iraq represented an opportunity to build an
alternative popular mobilization because it involved both Europe and the Arab world and,
for the first time, brought immigrant communities into the political process. This was
particularly important in Britain, for example, where Hindus and Sikhs as well as
Muslims joined the demonstrations. At the moment, however, these groups do not have
serious formal political representation and there is a real need for progressive elected
representatives to reach out to them.

Finally, such a strategy has to counter the sophisticated organizational infrastructure of
these groups. I would emphasize four factors:

• Education. Universal primary education would be very important in reducing the

incentive to send children to religious schools. Education of girls is especially
important.

• Media. There needs to be much greater investment in global public (but not state)

radio and TV. Independent community radio is especially important in countering
extremist propaganda, as has been shown in Serbia and parts of Africa.

• Welfare. The decline in social services has provided openings for humanitarian

NGOs who also bring with them a political message.

• Jobs. Unemployed or criminalized young men are the main breeding ground for

these ideologies. Development needs to give priority to legitimate ways for these
young people to make a living.

III. What can the United Nations and Other Collective Security Organizations do?

The biggest obstacle to constructive action within the United Nations is the ‘war on
terror’. Had the United Nations succeeded in avoiding the war in Iraq, this would have
greatly strengthened the legitimacy of the United Nations and the multilateral system and
provided basis for further action. Unfortunately, the opposite happened.

IV. What can be done now?

First, the United Nations should try to have a presence in Iraq and in the various long-
running conflicts so as to provide space for alternative more moderate political
tendencies. The Middle East is critical but it would also be important if a way could be
found to internationalize some of the other flashpoints, for example, Chechnya and
Kashmir.

Secondly, there should be an emphasis on the language of international law and human
rights rather than war. For example, the attack on the world trade towers should have
been described as a ‘crime against humanity’ not an attack on the United States.

Thirdly, the United Nations could play a significant role in support of grass roots
mobilization against extremist violence, by bringing different groups together, involving
them in debates and giving them access to high levels of decision-making. Women’s
groups are particularly important in this respect.

Finally, the Millennium goals could be understood as strategy to counter the rise of
violent militancy since they include the need for universal literacy or poverty reduction,
which could reduce the influence of groups that prey on social insecurity.

Above all, the most important challenge is cognitive; how to take seriously the principle
that all human beings are equal.