226 KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI
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Kazimierz Twardowski
THE PRINCIPAL TRENDS OF SCIENTIFIC ETHICS
(edited by Izydora Dąmbska)
In scientific ethics which is equivalent to the theory of human action analysed in terms of the value of goodness, researches tend to follow different directions depending on how its principal problems are solved. Thus, as regards the scope of procedurę of ethical research, we can distinguish between individual and social ethics. The ąuestion about the source of morality (what is the origin of the diffe-rence between good and evil acts) is the point of departure of heteronomic (authori-tative) and autonomous ethics. Different answers to the ąuestion about the ethical foundation (i.e. the mótivation of good acts) lead to ethical emotionalism or intellectualism, with ethical rigorism as one of its variants. The answers to the problems involved in the ethical criterion, as far as its contents is concerned, lead either to teleological (eudaemonism or perfectionism) or ateleological or nomical ethics. If it is thought necessary to justify some ethical criterion, the justifications tend either in the direction of ethical apriorism or empirism. The ąuestion about the validity of the ethical criterion is answered either in terms of absolutist or relativist ethics. Metascientific analyses of the cognitive status of ethics in turn provide the points for debates between those advocating the scientific naturę of morał axiology and normative ethics and the followers of descriptive ethics.
Analyses and critiąues of these and some other directions of ethical research make up this part of the lectures in ethics which were intended as an introduction to a history of scientific ethics and to the lectures on ethical scepticism (part two) and on the tasks of scientific ethics (part three).