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Wycena kredytu bankowego w warunkach asymetrii informacji 151

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PRICING BANK CREDIT UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Summary

This paper shows that credit market is burdened with asymmetric information. There are informational asymmetries between banks and borrowers about the risk of the credit investment. The entrepreneurs are better informed then banks.

The first section describes the credit market and the role of the collateral and the interest ratę. The third section focuses on credit price when there is symmetric informa-