Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka ęape-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Basin Ozeti
The prospect of anarchy ■ By Edward N. Luttwak
ManyAmericansnowbelievethatthe United States is depleting its military strength, diplomatic leverage and treasury to pursue unrealistic aims in Iraq. They are right.
Democracy seems to interest few Iraąis, given the widespread Shiite proclivity to follow unelected cler-ics, the Sunni rejection of the principle of majority rule and the preference of many Kurds for tribe and elan over elected govemments.
International Herald Tribune
Thursday, August 19,2004
Reconstruction was supposed to advance rapidly with surging oil export revenues, but is hardly gaining on the continuing destruction inflicted by sabotage and thievery. And in any case, it is unlikely that the new Iraąi interim government will be able to oversee meaningful elections in a country where its authority is morę widely denied than recognized.
Yet few Aihericans are prepared to simply abandon Iraq. For one, they are rightly concemed that to do so would be a mortal blow to America’s global credibility and would encourage violent Islamists everywhere.
An outright withdrawal would leave the interim gov-emment to face the attacks of emboldened Baath re-gime loyalists, Sunni revanchists, local and foreign Is-lamist extremists and the numerous Shiite militias.
The likely result would be the defection of the gov-emmenfs army, police and national guard members, followed by a collapse and then civil war. Worse might follow in the Middle East — it usually does — even to the point of invasions by Iran, Turkey and possibly oth-ers, initiating new cycles of repression and violence.
Thus the likely consequences of an American aban-
donment are so bleak that few Americans are even the Shiite opposition, supplying Sadr’s militia and en-wiiling to contemplate it. This is a mistake: It is pre- couraging Syria to help Islamist terrorists sneak into cisely because unpredictable mayhem is so predictable Iraq. But an American withdrawal would mean the that the United States might be able to disengage from end of any hopes for a unified, Shiite-led Iraq, which Iraq at little cost, or even perhaps advantageously. is Iran’s long-term goal, and likely a restored Sunni Here’s why: In Iraq America faces several different supremacy, which is Iran’s greatest fear. enemies, as well as some unhelpful nominał allies. As As for Turkey, America’s ever-more nominał ally, it
things stand, their intense mutual hostility now now seems focused on uniting the Turkmen minority brings no advantage to the United States. But all could in Iraq under its leadership, while dividing the Kurds. be unbalanced by a well-devised policy of disengage- It has done nothing to help the United States — and ment, and forced to stop harming American interests Turkey could do much, most obviously sharing intel-and possibly even serve them in some degree. ligence information. But if the alternative is an immi-
At present, because the United States is fully committed in Iraq, the Shiite followers of the rene-gade elerie Moktada al-Sadr feel free to attack the same American forces that elsewhere are fighting Sunnis bent on restoring their an-cestral supremacy. Many Shiite eleries and the population at large — the verypeople the Sunnis are hoping to oppress once again — either applaud Sadr or do nothing to stop him.
But if the Shiites were persuaded that America might truły abandon them to face Saddam Husseirfs loyalists alone, it seems certain that they would quickly revert to the attitude of collaboration with the occupation forces they showed in the aftermath of the invasion.
Likewise, while some say that Iran and Turkey would see an anarchical Iraq as an opportunity to ex-pand their influence, that seems unlikely. Rather, a di-vided Iraq would be a base from which those coun-tries’ enemies — especially dissident Kurds — would be able to operate.
For now, with the United States viewed as deter-mined to stay the course, the hard-liners in Iran can
nent American withdrawal — and a de facto independent Iraqi Kurdistan — Turkey would soon come to heel.
The threat of disengagement would affect the lesser players as well. Kuwait, whose existence depends on U.S. power, has done little to help. At a time of explod-
_ ing oil revenues, and with
Kuwaiti subcontractors collect-ing huge sums from Pentagon contracts, the Kuwait Red Crescent is sending only odd truckloads of food into Iraq. As for the Saudis, their attitude is exempl«fied by their recent offer of an Islamie contingent to help garrison Iraq: It sounded courageous, but turned out to be a promise of troops other than their own, and was hedged by conditions that madę it worse than useless.
Yet Kuwait and Saudi Arabia would be greatly en-dangered by an anarchical Iraq, which might even al-low Iran to invade its Southern regions on the pretext of protecting fellow Shiites. Again, the threat of American withdrawal would be apt to concentrate minds wonderfully. The goal would be to get Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to replace the American taxpayer in
Because unpredictable mayhem is so predictable, the U.S. may be able to disengage from lraq.
pursue their anti-American vendetta by encouraging aiding Iraq; the two could also jointly sponsor peace-
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