3071579754

KWARTALNIK

POLONICUM

Zofia Zielińska

Rozbiory Polski

szeń w Rzeczypospolitej, w stosunku do Rosji Czartoryscy żywili złudzenia. Sądzili, że mając nad Polską kolosalną przewagę, w sprzyjających okolicznościach Petersburg zezwoli na aukcję wojska i reformy polityczne w ograniczonym, kontrolowanym przez siebie zakresie. Takie były fundamenty ich rosyjskiej orientacji i z takimi nadziejami wkroczyli w bezkrólewie po śmierci Augusta III (1763). Liczenie się z Rosją było tym bardziej konieczne, że wobec zaborczych dążeń Prus i bezsilności militarnej Polski, jedynym strażnikiem integralności terytorialnej szlacheckiego państwa za Sasów pozostawała Rosja. Petersburg, traktując Rzeczpospolitą jako teren swej dominacji, nie był zainteresowany dzieleniem się nią z Prusami. Słynne „es ser impraktikabel . jakie usłyszał władca Prus Fryderyk I, gdy w 1711 r. zaproponował Piotrowi I rozbiór Polski, stanowiło wyraz mocarstwowych aspiracji Petersburga i przekonania, że Rosja jest w stanie samodzielnie władać Rzecząpospolitą.

Od 1733 r. Europa nie miała złudzeń, że po śmierci Augusta III kolejnego króla narzuci Polsce Rosja. Nad Newą już w 1762 r. przeważyła opinia, że tym razem powinien to być rodowity Polak, pozbawiony nawet tak słabego oparcia zagranicznego, jakie the reign of the Wetlin dynasty, Russia was Poland’s only guar-antor of territorial integrity in view of Prussias plans of invasion and, at the same time, the military weakness of the nobility-gov-erned country. Seeing Poland as a rerritory under its own domi-nation, St. Petersburg was not at all interested in sharing it with Berlin, llie famous phrasc "essei impracticabeF, which Frederick I of Prussia heard from Tsar Peter Is lips in 1711, when he posed to him the idea of partitioning Poland, was a elear indication of St. Petersburga hegemonie aspirations and the tsar’s conviction that Russia was quite able to control the Commonwealth on its

From the year 1733, it was obvious to all of Europę that af-ter the death of Augustus III, the next king of Poland would be elected only with Russian approval. On the banks of the Neva Rivcr, as early as 1762 the opinion prevailed that this time it ought to be a Pole, who would be deprived of even such frail foreign support as the Wcttin dynasty had enjoyed due to its blood relarions with some ruling houses. The absence of foreign support guaranteed that the futurę king would be dependent, exdusively and permanently, on Russia alone. As the likely can-didare, Tsarina Catherine the Great chose Stanisław Poniatowski, her ex-lover from the years 1755-1758 and a member of the "Family”. She thought that Poniatowski would be “gratefol” to her for her favour, meaning of course fully subservient, and also that his Czartoryski undes would fulfil all the demands of Russia in exchange for the crown on their nephew’s head. Although she was aware of the fact that the “Family” was planning a thor-ough reform of the country, beginning with the abolition of the liberum veto, she did not reveal her intention of keeping this instrument of anarchy firmly in place, so as not to alarm the Czar-toryskis too early. She was confident that later she would be able to make them abandon their reformist aspirations.

At the Coronation Seym of Stanislaus Augustus Poniatowski, in December 1764, the tsarinas optimism already turned out to havc been unfounded. It is true that among many Russian demands only one was not complied with by the king and the Czartoryskis: to improve the position of non-Catholics in Poland, ofwhom Catherine had appointed herselfthe protectress. In this case, the leaders of the “Family” were loath to offond the nadon, which was very strongly against the idea of granting ei-ther foli tolerance or political rights to the non-Catholics. Dur-ing the Seym sessions of 1764 the new monarch revealed his earnest desire to see the reforms carried out, which was heard with some apprehension on the banks of the Neva, although Stanislaus Augustus yielded to St. Petersburg and for the time